Contractual Tax Reform by Abramowicz, Michael & Blair-Stanek, Andrew
William & Mary Law Review 
Volume 61 (2019-2020) 
Issue 6 Article 2 
5-2020 
Contractual Tax Reform 
Michael Abramowicz 
Andrew Blair-Stanek 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.wm.edu/wmlr 
 Part of the Banking and Finance Law Commons, and the Tax Law Commons 
Repository Citation 
Michael Abramowicz and Andrew Blair-Stanek, Contractual Tax Reform, 61 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 
1537 (2020), https://scholarship.law.wm.edu/wmlr/vol61/iss6/2 
Copyright c 2020 by the authors. This article is brought to you by the William & Mary Law School Scholarship 
Repository. 
https://scholarship.law.wm.edu/wmlr 
William & Mary
Law Review
VOLUME 61 NO. 6, 2020
CONTRACTUAL TAX REFORM
MICHAEL ABRAMOWICZ* & ANDREW BLAIR-STANEK**
ABSTRACT
One-size-fits-all taxation fails to accommodate diverse taxpayer
circumstances. This Article proposes allowing taxpayers to contract
into alternative tax regimes administered by private intermediaries.
Participating taxpayers would make payments to the intermediaries
pursuant to contract, and the intermediaries would be required to
pay to the government at least as much as these taxpayers would
have paid the government otherwise. That amount is determined
based on the actual tax receipts of a control group, taxpayers who
wish to contract with an intermediary but instead are chosen at
random to continue under the status quo. These alternative tax
regimes might better accommodate taxpayers’ preferences, leaving the
taxpayers with greater utility without reducing government revenue.
An intermediary could offer different substantive law, different
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procedural rules, or both. Taxpayers, for example, might receive
lower tax rates in exchange for forgoing deductions that cause the
taxpayer to engage in socially wasteful behavior. Advances in
artificial intelligence make contractual tax reform feasible.
2020] CONTRACTUAL TAX REFORM 1539
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INTRODUCTION
The same body of tax law applies to all taxpayers.1 This Article
proposes upending this bedrock principle, allowing private interme-
diaries to offer alternative tax regimes. The government would
insist that it receive at least as much tax revenue as it would have
received under existing tax law, so the intermediaries would have
powerful incentives to find packages of tax changes that would
benefit individuals without lowering tax collections. For example, in
exchange for lower rates, businesspersons might forsake the
deduction for business travel2 or might link their cash register di-
rectly into the tax reporting system.3 Some taxpayers might agree
to procedural rules that favor the government, in exchange for
smoother tax refund processing.4 Allowing some parents a deduc-
tion for childcare expenses might make them more likely to work
outside the home and thus actually increase tax collections.5
Alternative tax-rate structures with higher inframarginal and lower
marginal rates might encourage some taxpayers to work harder,
pay more taxes, and yet be happier as a result.6
Contractual tax reform requires data about taxpayers that would
help predict how much they would pay in an alternative tax regime.
Much of the tax literature presumes that taxpayers have private
information about themselves.7 Sometimes, the tax system can
1. See, e.g., I.R.C. § 1(a) (2012) (“There is hereby imposed on the taxable income of ...
every married individual.” (emphasis added)); id. § 11(a) (“A tax is hereby imposed for each
taxable year on the taxable income of every corporation.” (emphasis added)); see also U.S.
CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1 (“[A]ll Duties, Imposts and Excises shall be uniform throughout the
United States.”); United States v. Ptasynski, 462 U.S. 74, 79 (1983) (“Such taxes must be
uniform throughout the United States, and uniformity is achieved only when the tax operates
with the same force and effect in every place where the subject of it is found.” (quotation
marks and citations omitted)). Taxpayers may make certain elections from a limited menu
provided by tax law, but they cannot order something not on the menu. See infra note 274 and
accompanying text.
2. See infra Part I.A.1.
3. See infra Part I.C.2.
4. See infra Part II.B.1.
5. See infra Part I.A.2.
6. See infra Part I.B.2.
7. See ROBIN BOADWAY, FROM OPTIMAL TAX THEORY TO TAX POLICY 50 (2012) (“Asym-
metric information has been a key feature of normative tax analysis, particularly the fact that
the government is imperfectly informed about relevant characteristics of private agents.”).
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harness that information by allowing private parties to choose
among different regimes.8 But for the exchanges suggested above,
one cannot allow all taxpayers to opt in, because those most willing
to give up benefits would be those least likely to use them. A
businessperson who does not travel for business would be happy to
give up the deduction for business travel in exchange for a lower
rate.9 Similarly, the goal might be to find a married taxpayer who
would reenter the workforce after having children only in the
absence of tax distortions.10 The challenge is to identify groups of
taxpayers who can be expected, on average, to pay at least as much
tax in the alternative tax regime.
Artificial intelligence (AI) may now make it possible in many
cases to identify such taxpayers. Three revolutions—in computing
power, in the availability of data, and in the computer algorithms
used to analyze the data11—mean that computers can increasingly
predict human behavior with remarkable accuracy.12 As early as
2011, the retailer Target Corporation famously sent coupons for
baby clothes and cribs to a teenager, whom its data scientists had
predicted was pregnant.13 The teenager’s father came to a Target
Alex Raskolnikov, for example, suggests allowing taxpayers to choose between a “deterrence
regime” with high penalties and a “compliance regime” with features such as binding
arbitration. Alex Raskolnikov, Revealing Choices: Using Taxpayer Choice to Target Tax
Enforcement, 109 COLUM. L. REV. 689, 691 (2009).
8. The goal of some proposals is to produce a separating equilibrium, where taxpayers
have incentives to choose regimes in a way that is consistent with social welfare. See, e.g.,
Joseph E. Stiglitz, Self-Selection and Pareto Efficient Taxation, 17 J. PUB. ECON. 213, 230
(1982) (discussing a possible separating equilibrium). Those committed to gaming the tax
system will generally choose deterrence, while others choose compliance. Raskolnikov, supra
note 7, at 692-93, 745-46.
9. See infra Part I.A.1.
10. See infra Part I.A.2.
11. A notable advance has been the deep neural network. See Geoffrey E. Hinton,
Learning Multiple Layers of Representation, 11 TRENDS COGNITIVE SCI. 428, 428 (2007).
12. See, e.g., Steve Lohr, From Agriculture to Art—The A.I. Wave Sweeps In, N.Y. TIMES
(Oct. 21, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/10/21/business/from-agriculture-to-art-the-ai-
wave-sweeps-in.html [https://perma.cc/E86Q-LT2L] (discussing how AI can identify patterns
in data and make predictions); Carlos E. Perez, The Uncanny Intuition of Deep Learning to
Predict Human Behavior, MEDIUM (Jan. 12, 2017), https://medium.com/intuitionmachine/
deep-learning-to-predict-human-behavior-a2cd2ce14132 [https://perma.cc/9PYT-34DQ]; see
also CHRISTOPHER M. BISHOP, PATTERN RECOGNITION AND MACHINE LEARNING 32-33 (2006)
(describing the various methods of computer-based prediction).
13. Charles Duhigg, How Companies Learn Your Secrets, N.Y. TIMES MAG. (Feb. 16, 2012),
https://www.nytimes.com/2012/02/19/magazine/shopping-habits.html [https://perma.cc/VD4U-
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store furious about the mailing, but later apologized when he found
out that his daughter was in fact pregnant.14 Since 2011, AI has
grown ever more capable, and today, such anecdotes seem unsur-
prising.15 Legal scholars take for granted that algorithms can make
reasonably accurate predictions, focusing instead on questions of
when and how the legal system should be able to rely on them.16
Even the best analysis will not provide foolproof predictions
about how different taxpayers will respond to alternative tax
regimes. But tax law already relies on predictive analytics. In the
United States, the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) has long used
data-driven computer models to determine the most promising audit
targets ex post.17 But tax law has never used AI or other data-driven
models to optimize or target tax rules ex ante, either to improve
efficiency or to maximize tax revenues.18 Tax scholars have ignored
the possibility of optimizing tax law using data science.19
Y4GB].
14. Id. 
15. See, e.g., Perez, supra note 12.
16. See, e.g., Danielle Keats Citron & Frank Pasquale, The Scored Society: Due Process
for Automated Predictions, 89 WASH. L. REV. 1, 27-28 (2014) (urging those affected adversely
by predictions be given due process rights to challenge them); Judge Noel L. Hillman, The Use
of Artificial Intelligence in Gauging the Risk of Recidivism, 58 JUDGES J. 36, 36-38 (2019)
(arguing that use of AI in sentencing may violate due process even if it is accurate); Sonia K.
Katyal, Private Accountability in the Age of Artificial Intelligence, 66 UCLA L. REV. 54, 61
(2019) (arguing a variety of legal tools to reduce the opacity of artificial intelligence).
17. The IRS has a highly confidential statistical methodology called the Discriminant
Index Function (DIF) that scores the likelihood of an audit that increases tax revenue; the
higher the DIF score, the greater the probability of being audited. IRM 4.1.3.2 (Aug. 10, 2012).
The IRS also uses totally random audits to improve the data used in the DIF. Id. at 4.22.1.5(5)
(Oct. 1, 2008). Scholars have discussed using AI to model tax avoidance and ways to catch
avoiders, again, ex post. E.g., Erik Hemberg et al., Tax Non-Compliance Detection Using Co-
Evolution of Tax Evasion Risk and Audit Likelihood, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE 15TH
INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE AND LAW 79, 87 (2015), https://
taxprof.typepad.com/files/taxpaper.pdf [https://perma.cc/F5ZW-CRUR].
18. Indeed, it is doubtful whether the IRS has the expertise or capacity to optimize tax law
ex ante using AI. 1 NAT’L TAXPAYER ADVOCATE, ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS 2017, at 173,
215 (2017), https://taxpayeradvocate.irs.gov/Media/Default/Documents/2017-ARC/ARC17_
Volume1.pdf [https://perma.cc/AVU7-B8L9] (noting that the IRS uses “data mining models,”
among other techniques, to stop refunds on potentially false returns, but has an unacceptably
high rate of false positives); see also TREASURY INSPECTOR GEN. FOR TAX ADMIN., REVIEW OF
THE ELECTRONIC FRAUD DETECTION SYSTEM (Sept. 29, 2015), https://www.treasury.gov/tigta/
auditreports/2015reports/201520093fr.html [https://perma.cc/462Q-WC3D] (discussing the
poor state of the IRS’s technology).
19. The apparently sole exception is Christian Baker et al., A Big Data Approach to
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Perhaps the reason for this gap in the literature is the justifiable
fear that a government empowered to use AI to change individual
tax regimes might make serious errors or, more nefariously, favor
some taxpayers and discriminate against others. But this Article
proposes alternative regimes entered into through voluntary pri-
vate contractual arrangements. Such an approach not only reduces
the danger of governmental abuse but also ensures that private
parties have robust incentives to identify areas in which available
data allows sufficiently confident predictions.
Contractual tax reform would require careful implementation.20
Private intermediaries would design alternative tax regimes and
decide which taxpayers to invite. These private intermediaries must
have proper incentives to identify regimes that improve taxpayer
utility while producing at least as much tax revenues for the
government. Our proposal provides these incentives by randomly
assigning some taxpayers who would like to be subject to an
alternative regime to a control group subject to generally applicable
tax law. This group’s tax receipts would determine how much the
intermediary must pay to the government. The design ensures that
the arrangement will not harm the government, and the require-
ment that taxpayers affirmatively opt in ensures that taxpayers
expect it to benefit them. It might seem that the only losers are the
taxpayers stuck in the status quo by random chance, yet this Article
will demonstrate how these taxpayers can benefit too.21
Suppose, for example, that a private intermediary called “Taxes,
Inc.” hires tax experts and AI experts to collaborate. The firm
identifies one million candidate taxpayers to invite to opt into an
alternative tax regime. Taxes, Inc. would send these taxpayers an
invitation to opt in, along with disclosures about the upsides and
downsides of the alternative regime.22 Suppose that 100,000 of the
Optimal Sales Taxation 1 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 20130, 2014),
https:// www.nber.org/papers/w20130 [https://perma.cc/7PX6-VLLW] (dealing only with sales
tax, not income tax or corporate tax).
20. Contractual tax reform involves experimentation using real-world conditions, which
is in stark contrast to the laboratory-based experimentation into individuals’ behavior that
is common in areas such as taxation. For a good review of laboratory-based experimentation,
see James Alm & Sarah Jacobson, Using Laboratory Experiments in Public Economics, 60
NAT’L TAX J. 129, 133-34 (2007).
21. See infra text accompanying notes 284-86.
22. Regarding disclosures to avoid exploitation, see infra Part III.A.1.
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invitees agree to participate and are deemed suitable candidates
after further voluntary disclosures to Taxes, Inc. A randomly se-
lected subset of these opting-in taxpayers (say, 10 percent, mean-
ing 10,000 taxpayers) would be assigned at random to the control
group. But the other 90,000 would be bound by the alternative tax
regime; the alternative tax regime would be a contract between
them and Taxes, Inc. If the 90,000 taxpayers—the “treatment
group”—paid more than 9.0 times the taxes paid by the control
group, then Taxes, Inc. would receive the excess (or some fraction
thereof) as profits. But if the treatment group paid less than 9.0
times the taxes paid by the control group, Taxes, Inc. would have to
reimburse the government the difference (or the same fraction
thereof).23
Private intermediaries could offer alternative tax regimes to
individuals or to business entities such as corporations.24 The al-
ternative tax regimes could be purely substantive, purely proce-
dural, or a combination of both. Some limitations on alternative tax
regimes are desirable. Many tax benefits aim to achieve nontax
policy goals.25 For example, the research and development (R&D)
tax credit encourages scientific and engineering expenditures.26 The
underlying theory is that businesses do not capture all the benefits
23. Mathematical formulas other than fractions of the difference in collection are possible.
The only constraint in designing the formulas for what Taxes, Inc. receives for increased
collections (or what Taxes, Inc. pays for shortfalls) is that they must give Taxes, Inc.
incentives to design alternative tax regimes that have an expected value greater than the
expected value of the status quo.
24. C corporations and certain types of trusts are examples of business entities that pay
taxes. I.R.C. § 11 (2012) (imposing tax on C corporations); Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(b) (2019)
(deeming a number of types of business entities to be corporations); cf. I.R.C. § 641(a)
(imposing tax on trusts). Other business entities, such as partnerships and S corporations,
are not taxpaying entities, but rather “pass through” their income and other tax attributes
to their partners, shareholders, or other owners. I.R.C. § 701 (“A partnership as such shall not
be subject to the income tax imposed by this chapter. Persons carrying on business as
partners shall be liable for income tax only in their separate or individual capacities.”); id.
§ 1363(a) (“[A]n S corporation shall not be subject to the taxes imposed by this chapter.”).
25. See generally Borris I. Bittker, Accounting for Federal “Tax Subsidies” in the National
Budget, 22 NAT’L TAX J. 244 (1969); J. Clifton Fleming, Jr. & Robert J. Peroni, Can Tax
Expenditure Analysis Be Divorced from a Normative Tax Base?: A Critique of the “New
Paradigm” and Its Denouement, 30 VA. TAX REV. 135 (2010).
26. See I.R.C. § 41; see also id. § 174 (allowing immediate deduction for R&D expenditures,
in contravention of the general principle of capitalization for expenditures creating multiyear
benefits).
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of their R&D expenses,27 and so society benefits from favorable tax
treatment of R&D.28 Similarly, many other tax expenditures aim to
encourage taxpayers to create positive externalities or to reduce
negative externalities. Examples include various tax benefits for
higher education,29 clean energy,30 and homeownership.31 The
simplest solution is for Congress to bar alternative regimes that
remove specified tax benefits or, particularly in early implemen-
tations, to limit the scope of contractual tax reform to specific
provisions.32 Blocking some tax benefits will, of course, be less of an
issue in countries (or states) that make less use of tax benefits to
further nontax policy goals.33 Though most of our examples will
focus on the U.S. federal tax system because of its familiarity,
contractual tax reform might be as or more desirable in other
jurisdictions.
There are strong theoretical reasons to believe that welfare-
improving alternative tax regimes could exist even in the U.S. fed-
eral tax system. The U.S. system is extraordinarily expensive to
comply with and to administer,34 yet it leaves hundreds of billions
of dollars owed to the government uncollected35 and creates massive
economic distortions.36 These administrative costs and inefficiencies
are potential gains that can be distributed among taxpayers, the
government, and intermediaries, so long as an intermediary is able
to target its offers sufficiently well.
27. CONG. RESEARCH SERV., S. PRT. 112-45, TAX EXPENDITURES: COMPENDIUM OF BACK-
GROUND MATERIAL ON INDIVIDUAL PROVISIONS 104 (2012) (“[B]usinesses in general are un-
likely to invest in R&D in amounts consistent with its social returns.”).
28. Martin A. Sullivan, Economic Analysis: Can a Patent Box Promote Advanced Man-
ufacturing?, 147 TAX NOTES 1347, 1348 (2015) (“[D]ecades of research by leading economists
indicates that externalities from R&D not only exist but are very large.”).
29. I.R.C. § 25A.
30. Id. §§ 45, 136, 179D.
31. Id. § 163(h).
32. A drawback is that this may limit the most creative alternative regimes, such as
those that do not even use the concept of deductions. See, e.g., infra notes 169-76 and ac-
companying text.
33. Countries such as Germany, the Netherlands, and South Korea have much lower lev-
els of tax expenditures than the United States. See JOE MINARIK, TAX EXPENDITURES IN
OECD COUNTRIES 28 (2009), http://www.oecd.org/governance/budgeting/42976288.pdf [https://
perma.cc/GMD4-EDHF].
34. See infra Part I.C.1.
35. See infra Part I.C.2.
36. See infra Part I.A.
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Tax rate schedules will often be a source of beneficial exchanges,
because the status quo balances two irreconcilable goals.37 The first
goal, based on conceptions of equity, is progressivity.38 Progressivity
demands that higher earners should pay not merely a higher tax
than lower earners, but a higher percentage of their earnings.39 As
a result, the marginal tax rate a taxpayer pays (that is, the tax on
the last dollar of income) should be higher than the inframarginal
rates (that is, the tax on lower dollars of income). The second goal,
based on efficiency concerns, is to minimize distortions from tax.40
Inframarginal tax rates are less likely to affect taxpayers’ behavior
than marginal rates, because each additional dollar of income
contributes less to utility than the prior dollar, and because a unit
of leisure time is more valuable when there is less of it.41 Efficiency
thus counsels toward low marginal rates, even at the expense of
higher inframarginal rates. Indeed, the least distortionary tax is a
lump-sum tax with a zero marginal rate.42 Thus, the dilemma:
progressivity requires that marginal rates increase with income,
while efficiency is best served by lump-sum taxation or low marginal
rates.
37. See infra Part I.B (giving examples of such exchanges based on tax rate schedules).
38. See BORIS I. BITTKER & LAWRENCE LOKKEN, 1 FEDERAL TAXATION OF INCOME, ESTATES,
AND GIFTS ¶ 3.4 (3d ed. 1999).
39. See id. ¶ 3.5.3; Walter J. Blum & Harry Kalven, Jr., The Uneasy Case for Progressive
Taxation, 19 U. CHI. L. REV. 417, 419 (1952); see also Sarah B. Lawsky, On the Edge:
Declining Marginal Utility and Tax Policy, 95 MINN. L. REV. 904, 905 (2011).
40. See, e.g., Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Why the Legal System Is Less Efficient than
the Income Tax in Redistributing Income, 23 J. LEGAL STUD. 667, 667 (1994) (noting that taxes
may reduce efficiency by distorting work choices).
41. Joseph Bankman & Thomas Griffith, Social Welfare and the Rate Structure: A New
Look at Progressive Taxation, 75 CALIF. L. REV. 1905, 1947 (1987) (noting that “consumption
and leisure have declining marginal utility”). Someone who is on the margin of whether to
work (and thus be a taxpayer) at all, however, may be sensitive to the tax rate charged on the
first dollars earned. See Emmanuel Saez, Optimal Income Transfer Programs: Intensive
Versus Extensive Labor Supply Responses, 117 Q.J. ECON. 1039, 1064 (2002) (noting that the
optimal choice between or combination of Negative Income Tax and Earned Income Tax
Credit programs depends on behavioral responses at both the extensive margin (that is,
whether to work at all) and intensive margin (that is, how much to work)). The existence of
heterogeneity in behavioral responses enhances our broader argument for allowing alter-
native tax regimes adapted to individual characteristics.
42. See BOADWAY, supra note 7, at 71, 143, 182 (noting that a lack of government in-
formation is a reason we do not have lump sum taxes); Stiglitz, supra note 8, at 217
(analyzing lump-sum-only taxation as the “first-best optimum” policy).
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These two goals are irreconcilable only if the same tax rate
schedule applies to all taxpayers. Contractual tax reform allows
tailoring tax rate schedules to taxpayers’ characteristics and pref-
erences, enabling both progressivity and efficiency. Tax schedules
with relatively high inframarginal rates and low marginal rates are
possible under contractual tax reforms targeted to taxpayers’ cir-
cumstances.43 If AI makes possible identification of those who would
accept such alternative schedules and yet could expect to pay at
least as much under them, then contractual tax reform can offer
substantial benefits to both the government and taxpayers. Even if
intermediaries can make confident predictions only that a small set
of taxpayers, such as taxpayers subject to an especially inefficient
deduction, would benefit from an alternative tax regime while still
paying higher taxes, the benefits could be substantial for those
taxpayers.44
If contractual tax reform were sufficiently widespread, it might
have broad benefits beyond those who opt into alternative tax re-
gimes. Congress, the IRS, and scholars may learn from the success
or failure of alternative tax regimes.45 Contractual tax reform might
support experimentation with tax reform goals previously thought
to require universally applicable tax changes, such as moves to
mark-to-market taxation of securities in exchange for lower rates46
or replacement of corporate taxes with government holdings of
nonvoting corporate stock.47
43. See infra Part I.B.
44. See infra Part I.B.2.
45. Indeed, if contractual tax reform became common, the tax code in Title 26 of the U.S.
Code might come to be seen as a “penalty default[ ]” rule. See Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner,
Filling Gaps in Incomplete Contracts: An Economic Theory of Default Rules, 99 YALE L.J. 87,
91 (1989). Lawmakers might be more willing to enact cumbersome tax provisions if they know
that affected taxpayers can contract around them with alternative tax regimes that lack the
provisions. See id.
46. “Mark-to-market” means that the securities (or other assets) are treated as if sold at
the end of the year for their fair market value. See David A. Weisbach, A Partial Mark-to-
Market Tax System, 53 TAX L. REV. 95, 95-96 (1999) (proposing a generalized version of this
alternative regime, with different rates for assets such as securities marked-to-market than
for assets not marked-to-market). But see Edward A. Zelinsky, For Realization: Income
Taxation, Sectoral Accretionism, and the Virtue of Attainable Virtues, 19 CARDOZO L. REV. 861,
861-62 & n.2 (1997) (arguing against any mark-to-market system).
47. See infra Part I.D.
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The prior literature has considered the possibility that the gov-
ernment might improve policy with randomized experiments in a
variety of areas,48 including tax law.49 Other scholars, meanwhile,
have proposed allowing private parties to opt out of default eco-
nomic regulation in areas such as securities law50 and bankruptcy,51
and a recent article suggests that corporations should be allowed to
appoint private firms to serve the function of a board of directors.52
But the literature on government experimentation has ignored the
literature on opting out of regulation and vice versa. The possibility
that private parties might facilitate contracting around default tax
law has seemingly received no prior consideration.
Perhaps the closest suggestion is Saul Levmore’s proposal to
“allow every wealthy individual, at age sixty for example, to choose
among revenue-neutral combinations of income and estate tax
rates.”53 Levmore does not explore the more general question of how
the government or private parties might identify alternative tax
regimes to apply to particular taxpayers.54 Meanwhile, Anthony
Casey and Anthony Niblett argue that developments in AI antici-
pate the increasing ability of the government to fashion “microdirec-
tives” responsive to circumstances, combining the predictability of
rules with the flexibility of standards,55 and they offer a brief
48. See, e.g., Talia B. Gillis, Putting Disclosure to the Test: Toward Better Evidence-Based
Policy, 28 LOY. CONSUMER L. REV. 31, 38 (2015) (consumer protection law); Zachary J. Gubler,
Making Experimental Rules Work, 67 ADMIN. L. REV. 551, 558 (2015) (securities law); Lisa
Larrimore Ouellette, Patent Experimentalism, 101 VA. L. REV. 65, 69-70 (2015) (patent law);
Hannah J. Wiseman & Dave Owen, Federal Laboratories of Democracy, 52 U.C. DAVIS L. REV.
1119, 1152-68 (2018) (agricultural policy).
49. See Michael Abramowicz, Tax Experimentation, 71 FLA. L. REV., 65, 67-68 (2019).
50. See Roberta Romano, Empowering Investors: A Market Approach to Securities Reg-
ulation, 107 YALE L.J. 2359, 2361-64 (1998) (urging adoption of a federalist model of securi-
ties regulation modeled on the federalist system of corporate governance).
51. See Alan Schwartz, A Contract Theory Approach to Business Bankruptcy, 107 YALE
L.J. 1807, 1814, 1850 (1998) (arguing that requiring firms to use a particular bankruptcy
system increases a borrowing firm’s cost of capital).
52. Stephen M. Bainbridge & M. Todd Henderson, Boards-R-Us: Reconceptualizing
Corporate Boards, 66 STAN. L. REV. 1051, 1070 (2014).
53. Saul Levmore, From Helmets to Savings and Inheritance Taxes: Regulatory Intensity,
Information Revelation, and Internalities, 81 U. CHI. L. REV. 229, 247 (2014) (emphasis
added).
54. See id. at 229-30.
55. Anthony J. Casey & Anthony Niblett, The Death of Rules and Standards, 92 IND. L.J.
1401, 1411 (2017).
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application to tax law.56 But their ambition is for the law to take
into account diverse circumstances itself;57 they do not consider
the possibility that private parties might identify citizens who
then may opt into particular alternative legal rules.
We are not the first to consider allowing nongovernmental en-
tities to create tax policy in some way, however. The economist Erzo
Luttmer proposed a mechanism in which profit-maximizing firms
redistribute income.58 The government would assign employees at
random to employers, each receiving the same base salary.59 An
employee may then enter into an agreement to work with the em-
ployer, or can work for a third party and give the assigned employer
a government-set fraction of the amount earned.60 The lower this
fraction, the greater the incentive to offer an attractive base salary,
thus encouraging intrafirm income redistribution.61 But Luttmer’s
proposal is impractical.62 Assigning employees at random to em-
ployers is inconsistent with foundational commitments of liberal
democracy. Nonetheless, Luttmer’s proposal underscores that prop-
erly incentivized private parties may be better situated than the
government to assess individuals’ abilities and thus offer them bet-
ter tax schedules.63 Our project similarly seeks to take advantage of
private information, but to allow taxpayers and private tax interme-
diaries to freely choose one another.
The Article proceeds as follows. Part I offers several examples of
alternative tax regimes that private intermediaries might offer to
taxpayers. These examples highlight inefficiencies from current
56. Casey and Niblett consider a tax authority using AI “to provide advance tax rulings,”
indicating how the law would apply to particular individuals. Id. at 1419.
57. See, e.g., id. at 1417.
58. Erzo F.P. Luttmer, Can Income Redistribution Be Privatized? 2 (2001) (unpublished
manuscript) (on file with the National Bureau of Economic Research), http://users.nber.org/~
luttmer/privatize.pdf [https://perma.cc/326S-XFRG].
59. Id. at 5.
60. Id.
61. See id. at 5-8.
62. See id. at 8 (“To make privatized redistribution feasible, many practical issues would
need to be addressed including opportunities for employment changes, bankruptcy, retirement
rules and the age at which individuals are matched to firms.”).
63. Id. at 7 (noting that this system gives employers incentives “to improve their
assessments of workers’ abilities”). What Luttmer refers to as “incentive schedule[s]” from
assigned employers are economically the same as tax schedules. Compare id., with I.R.C. § 1
(2012).
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one-size-fits-all tax law. Part II explores the mechanics of how
private intermediaries could offer alternative regimes to taxpayers.
It explains the responsibilities of intermediaries and how the gov-
ernment can ensure that it will be able to pay its bills, and it also
describes how the government might prevent various manipula-
tions, such as shifting income between periods or changing tax filing
status, and deal with complications such as tax expenditures. Part
III considers potential objections. Reliance on private intermediaries
necessitates some regulation to prevent financial or privacy abuses,
similar to existing financial and privacy regulation. Properly
implemented, contractual tax reform need not worsen inequality or
horizontal inequity and in fact could help reduce these problems. A
brief conclusion follows.
I. APPLICATIONS
The goal of this Article’s proposal is for some taxpayers to receive
the option of an alternative tax regime expected to leave the
taxpayers better off and increase the tax revenue received by the
government (or at least keep tax revenues constant). This Part will
describe some hypothetical alternative regimes, while the next Part
explains the mechanisms of contractual tax reform.
A. Changing the Tax Base
In the U.S. income tax system, the “tax base” is taxable income:
the taxpayer’s gross income minus the taxpayer’s deductions.64 Any
change to tax—whether it be traditional tax reform or contractual
tax reform—can expand the tax base by expanding the definition of
what is in gross income65 or by reducing the available deductions.66
64. I.R.C. §§ 1, 11, 63(a) (2012).
65. The most obvious way to expand gross income is to contract the “exclusions” from
gross income, which are “a receipt or accrual that would, but for a specific exclusion provided
by the Code or administrative action, be included in a taxpayer's gross income.” RICHARD A.
WESTIN, TAX DICTIONARY 249 (2000). I.R.C. §§ 101 through 112, 115, 117 through 123, and
125 through 127 contain express exclusions. See I.R.C. §§ 101-112, 115, 117-123, 125-127.
66. Expanding the tax base is a commonly touted element of tax reform. See, e.g., STAFF
OF THE JOINT COMM. ON TAX’N, 99TH CONG., GENERAL EXPLANATION OF THE TAX REFORM ACT
OF 1986, at 6-11 (Comm. Print 1987).
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Conversely, a change to tax law can contract the tax base, such as
by offering a new deduction or exclusion.67 Alternative tax regimes
offered by private intermediaries could offer expansions, contrac-
tions, or both, with the goal of increasing overall tax revenues while
still leaving the taxpayer better off.
1. Expanding the Base
Consider businesspeople A and B, who both have gross income of
$140,000 and spend $40,000 per year on business travel to visit
clients.68 Assume for simplicity that both are subject to a flat 50
percent tax rate on all their taxable income.69 Although they appear
identical, their business travel activities differ substantially: A loves
sightseeing, whereas B only conducts business. A’s $40,000 spent
on business travel generates merely $10,000 in gross income, but
brings $20,000 worth of personal utility, because the travel allows
A to sightsee between business meetings.70 It seems irrational for A
to spend $40,000 on business travel that brings in only $10,000 in
profits and $20,000 in personal utility. But current tax law makes
such wasteful behavior entirely rational,71 since A can deduct the
$40,000 in travel expenses,72 reducing A’s tax bill by $20,000.73 A’s
67. See, e.g., I.R.C. § 101.
68. See id. § 162(a)(2) (“There shall be allowed as a deduction all the ordinary and nec-
essary expenses ... including ... traveling expenses ... while away from home in the pursuit of
a trade or business.”).
69. This rate is a simplification and is higher than the rates one would expect under
current law, where top federal marginal tax rates are 37 percent. I.R.C. § 1(a)-(d). State tax
rates, however, can add as much as 13.3 percent. See CAL. REV. & TAX. CODE § 17041 (West
2011); id. § 17043 (adding further 1 percent surtax on income); CAL. CONST. Art. XIII § 36(f)
(amending section 17041 to have a top rate of 12.3 percent).
70. See generally William A. Klein, The Deductibility of Transportation Expenses of a
Combination Business and Pleasure Trip—A Conceptual Analysis, 18 STAN. L. REV. 1099
(1966) (analyzing the problem of deductibility of business travel that creates personal utility).
71. With respect to A, the costs of the business trip are $40,000 in actual expenses, plus
the $5000 in taxes paid on the $10,000 in gross income generated by the travel. The total costs
to A are thus $45,000. Meanwhile, A’s benefits from the business trip are the $20,000 in
personal enjoyment, plus $20,000 in taxes saved because the business expenses are de-
ductible, plus $10,000 in gross income. Thus A’s benefits of $50,000 exceed A’s $45,000 in
costs. A’s surplus from the travel is the difference, $5000.
72. In theory, a deduction for business travel can be denied if the personal-consumption
aspect is egregiously large compared to the bona fide business motivations. But courts give
taxpayers a wide berth on such matters. See Palo Alto Town & Country Village, Inc. v.
Comm’r, 565 F.2d 1388, 1390-91 (9th Cir. 1977) (allowing lavish travel expense deduction
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distorted behavior has cost the government $15,000 in lost tax
revenue74 and made society as a whole $10,000 poorer.75
B ’s business travel, by contrast, is all about business. By
travelling, B earns $50,000 in additional income from clients, but
zero personal utility. B ’s after-tax benefit of the travel is $25,000,
that is, the additional $50,000 in income from clients, reduced by
the 50 percent tax rate. B would not travel for business without the
deductibility of travel expenses, because the $40,000 expense is
greater than this $25,000. With deductibility, the $40,000 in travel
expenses has an after-tax cost of only $20,000. B comes out $5000
ahead by taking the travel, while the government collects an
additional $5000 in tax revenue. The deductibility of B ’s travel
expenses thus increases social efficiency by $10,000. Such behavior
explains why the tax code currently allows deducting business
travel.76
Allowing B to deduct business expenses makes society better off,
while allowing A the same deduction does the opposite. Under
current law, the government makes no effort to distinguish between
A and B.77 Indeed, the government currently has no way to observe
that A enjoys $20,000 worth of personal utility from the travel (from
sightseeing) or that B ’s business travel is all about business.78 The
upon showing that it was helpful in one instance to the taxpayer); Henry v. Comm’r, 36 T.C.
879, 884 (1961) (“In determining that which is ‘necessary’ to a taxpayer’s trade or business,
the taxpayer is ordinarily the best judge on the matter, and we would hesitate to substitute
our own discretion for his.”). A’s sightseeing expenses would not be deductible since they are
clearly personal expenses. I.R.C. § 262. Whether the overall trip is treated as a deductible
business trip or a personal trip is based on the facts and circumstances, with weight given to
factors such as time spent on business versus personal activities, not the amount of gross
income earned from the trip. See Treas. Reg. § 1.162-2(b) (2019).
73. We assumed for simplicity a 50 percent tax rate. A deduction of $40,000 for someone
with a 50 percent tax rate results in tax savings of 50 percent times $40,000, which equals
$20,000.
74. The travel resulted in gross income of $10,000 and a deduction of $40,000, for a
decrease in taxable income of $30,000. At the 50 percent tax rate, the government has lost
$15,000 in tax revenue.
75. As shown, A’s net benefit from the travel expenses is $5000, supra note 71, and the
government lost $15,000 in tax revenue, supra note 74. The $10,000 is the deadweight loss
to society.
76. See Treas. Reg. § 162-2.
77. See supra note 72.
78. See, e.g., Treas. Reg. § 162-2(b)(2) (“Whether a trip is related primarily to the
taxpayer's trade or business or is primarily personal in nature depends on the facts and
circumstances in each case.”).
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government also has no way to observe that A earns merely $10,000
in income from clients by travelling, whereas B earns $50,000.79
Contractual tax reform can address this problem. Private in-
termediaries could offer both A and B an alternative tax regime,
structured so that only those taxpayers who inefficiently take
advantage of travel deductions would opt in. For example, both A
and B could be offered an alternative tax regime where business
travel expenses are not deductible in exchange for lowering the tax
rate from 50 percent to 45 percent. (Recall that to keep the math
simple, we have assumed flat tax rates.) Simple cost-benefit
analysis shows that A will accept this alternative regime and forgo
all business travel,80 increasing A’s personal utility, increasing tax
revenues, and increasing overall social well-being. Meanwhile, B
will not opt in, thus sticking with current law, which is also a
socially efficient result.81
Crucially, under the alternative regime, the taxes collected from
A will increase by $8500.82 Although the alternative regime lowers
79. See id.
80. Under current law, when A takes the deductible travel, A has a gross income of
$140,000 and $40,000 in deductible travel expenses, leading to taxable income of $100,000
and after-tax income of $50,000. Adding in the $20,000 in personal utility from the travel, A
has total utility of $70,000. But by opting for the alternative regime and not taking the
business travel, A will have gross income of $130,000 and no deductions (since A no longer
travels), and thus taxable income of $130,000. The alternative regime provides a 45 percent
tax rate, leaving 55 percent of A’s income available after taxes. Fifty-five percent of $130,000
is $71,500, which is $1500 greater than A’s utility under current law.
81. Meanwhile, under current law, when B takes the deductible travel, B has a taxable
income of $100,000 (that is, $140,000 in gross income minus $40,000 in deductible travel
expenses), leading to after-tax income of $50,000. B has no additional personal utility from
the travel. If B is subject to the alternative regime and nonetheless still takes the travel, then
B will have taxable income of $140,000, which, with the 45 percent alternative tax rate, leaves
$77,000 after taxes. Subtracting the $40,000 in travel expenses, which would not be
deductible under the alternative regime, B is left with only $37,000, which is much worse than
the $50,000 under current law. Meanwhile, if B takes the alternative regime and does not
take the travel, then B will have a gross income of just $90,000, since B will lose $50,000 in
gross income from clients by not travelling. With the 45 percent alternative tax rate, that
leaves $49,500, which is less than the $50,000 under the current law. Thus, B will not opt for
the alternative regime.
82. Under current law, A took and deducted the business travel, resulting in taxable
income of $100,000 and taxes collected of $50,000 at the 50 percent rate. But under the
alternative regime, A will not take the business travel and thus will lose $10,000 in gross
income from clients, but will end up with taxable income of $130,000. At the 45 percent rate,
that results in $58,500 in taxes collected, which is $8500 greater than the $50,000 under
current law.
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the tax rate from 50 percent to 45 percent, taking away the de-
duction for business travel—a form of broadening the tax base—
more than makes up for the lowered tax rate. This $8500 in ad-
ditional tax revenue would likely more than cover any costs of ad-
ministering the alternative tax regime. Some portion of the $8500
would go to the private tax intermediary, with the remainder going
into government coffers.
Of course, not every taxpayer should have the opportunity to opt
into this alternative tax regime. Consider a taxpayer C, who never
takes business travel. C will happily give up the right to deduct
travel expenses in exchange for tax rates reduced from 50 percent
to 45 percent. But for C, this alternative tax regime would be a pure
windfall, providing lower taxes but zero social benefit. The private
intermediaries must not only design good alternative regimes, but
also invite only taxpayers who, if they opt in, are likely to increase
both tax collections and social welfare.
The most straightforward approach is likely for the private
intermediary to consider past travel expenses, offering the alterna-
tive tax regime only to those taxpayers who have taken substantial
travel-expense deductions in prior years.83 But private intermediar-
ies could feed much more sophisticated, detailed, useful data to their
AI. For example, taxpayers who use their credit cards on business
trips to pay for museum admission fees or sightseeing tours likely
receive higher personal utility from business travel. Moreover, since
someone who takes lots of for-pleasure travel presumably also gains
more utility from business travel, data on for-pleasure travel
patterns also might give some indication of a taxpayer’s personal
utility from business trips. The higher the personal utility a tax-
payer receives from business travel, the more likely that the de-
ductibility of business travel is creating distortions, as is the case
83. More sophisticated methods of deciding whom to invite to opt in would likely have
substantial benefits. Suppose that taxpayer D has the same observable characteristics as A
and B, with business travel expenses of $40,000 and a gross income of $140,000. But suppose
that D has already made plans to switch from travelling to meet clients in person to using
teleconferencing to conduct the same meetings. D would happily opt into the alternative tax
regime, producing a windfall to D at the expense of tax revenues. Artificial intelligence can
help predict which taxpayers likely would change their behavior without the alternative tax
regime. Companies that market teleconferencing services make use of AI to predict who is
most likely to buy their services in lieu of business travel, and a private tax intermediary
should also be able to identify the same taxpayers using AI.
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in the example of taxpayer A.84 It thus likely makes more sense—
both in terms of additional tax revenue and social welfare—for a
private intermediary to offer the alternative tax regime to such
taxpayers.
Of course, existing data cannot provide a final answer to ques-
tions of which taxpayers should receive the option of the alternative
tax regime. Actual experimentation in the real world by private
intermediaries would generate experience and additional data.
2. Contracting the Base
Scholars have long recognized that tax law hinders gender
equality by discouraging mothers from staying in (or reentering) the
workforce.85 Consider a woman who earns $30,000 per year and has
a husband who earns a great deal more than that. Suppose that the
marginal tax rate applicable to all of the wife’s taxable income is 50
percent.86 The couple then has children. The woman faces a decision:
stop working to care for the children87 or continue working but pay
$20,000 per year for childcare.88 Childcare expenses are not de-
ductible,89 so the after-tax benefit of continuing to work is $15,000,
84. See supra notes 70-75 and accompanying text.
85. See Shannon Weeks McCormack, Postpartum Taxation and the Squeezed Out Mom,
105 GEO. L.J. 1323, 1328-31 (2017).
86. In most marriages, the two spouses file a joint return. BITTKER & LOKKEN, supra note
38, ¶ 111.5.2. With joint returns, the lower earner pays higher marginal tax rates than the
low earner would pay if single. See id. Thus the application of the assumed top marginal rate
to the wife’s taxable income in this example is not unrealistic, despite her low gross income.
Of course, the problem exists even with lower marginal rates, with a concomitantly smaller
tax distortion.
87. Care provided by a taxpayer to his or her own children in the home is not taxed. It is
the paradigmatic example of untaxed “imputed income” under longstanding U.S. income tax
principles. See BITTKER & LOKKEN, supra note 38, ¶ 5.3.2.
88. See Darla Mercado, Forget College Tuition. Annual Child-Care Costs Exceed $20,000
in These States, CNBC (Aug. 29, 2018, 10:44 AM), https://www.cnbc.com/2018/08/28/forget-
college-tuition-annual-childcare-costs-exceed-20000-here.html [https://perma.cc/3WYF-FLVK]
(“Across the country, the average annual cost of child care is approaching parity with the cost
of in-state tuition at some universities.”).
89. I.R.C. § 262(a) (2012) (“Except as otherwise expressly provided ... no deduction shall
be allowed for personal, living, or family expenses.”); Smith v. Comm’r, 40 B.T.A. 1038, 1039
(1939); cf. Shannon Weeks McCormack, Overtaxing the Working Family: Uncle Sam and the
Childcare Squeeze, 114 MICH. L. REV. 559, 564 (2016) (arguing for allowing deductibility of
childcare costs). Congress has provided a rather limited dependent-care tax credit worth only
20 percent of a taxpayer’s “employment related expenses” for household services including the
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which is $5000 less than the cost of childcare. Assuming that she
acts solely based on present economic considerations and receives
no utility (or disutility) from work, the woman will rationally stop
working. This is inefficient. Society loses $10,000 because the wife
is no longer contributing $30,000 worth of labor, which would cost
only $20,000 in childcare. Government, society, and the couple
would all benefit from making their childcare deductible, which
would change her after-tax benefit of continuing to work to
$25,000,90 which exceeds the $20,000 cost of childcare.
Why then does the tax code not already allow a deduction for
childcare expenses? Because many mothers work and pay for child-
care without a deduction.91 Allowing such mothers to deduct child-
care would give them a tax windfall. For example, suppose that the
mother in the example above was earning $50,000 rather than
$30,000. She might then rationally continue working even without
childcare being deductible.92 Allowing her to deduct childcare would
result in a tax windfall of $10,000, without furthering either eco-
nomic efficiency or gender equity. As another example, suppose once
again that the mother earned only $30,000, but that she received
nonmonetary personal satisfaction worth $6000 from going to work
and getting out of the house. That benefit would cause the mother
to continue working, even without childcare being deductible.93 For
care of qualifying individuals, taking into account only $2400 of such expenses in a household
with one qualifying individual. I.R.C. § 21; see 2 BITTKER & LOKKEN, supra note 38, ¶ 37.2.2.
Alternatively, taxpayers whose employers provide a dependent-care flexible spending account
can exclude up to $5000 in childcare expenses. See I.R.C. § 129 (a)(2)(A), (d)(1) (excluding
employer-provided dependent-care assistance); I.R.C. § 125 (authorizing flexible spending
accounts).
90. The wife would earn $30,000 in additional gross income, but the couple could deduct
the $20,000 in childcare costs, resulting in additional taxable income of just $10,000. The
couple would pay $5000 in taxes on the $30,000 in earnings, leaving $25,000 in after-tax
benefit.
91. See McCormack, supra note 89, at 587 (explaining that most families need two in-
comes).
92. In this example, the after-tax benefit to the mother of continuing to work is $25,000,
which is the $50,000 in earnings minus the 50 percent in taxes. The cost of continuing to work
is $20,000, the cost of the childcare. Thus, the mother will have $5000 to spend after paying
for childcare.
93. In this example, the after-tax benefit of continuing to work is $21,000, that is, the
$15,000 income after taxes plus the $6000 in noneconomic personal utility from working. The
$20,000 cost of childcare is less than this.
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this taxpayer, a deduction for childcare would also result in a tax
windfall.
Contractual tax reform can solve this problem. Private interme-
diaries should offer the alternative tax regime, where childcare is
deductible, only to married taxpayers for whom the deduction seems
likely to make the difference between both spouses continuing to
work or not. Even without extensive computing power and AI, a
private intermediary might be able to identify such taxpayers by
looking only at both spouses’ prechild income, the couple’s mar-
ginal tax rate, and the cost of childcare near the taxpayers. But,
using AI, private intermediaries might target the invitations to
opt in even more precisely, projecting income potential.94 Moreover,
AI could even be used to estimate the noneconomic utility (or dis-
utility) the mother would receive from getting out of the house to go
to work, just as marketers use AI to aim products and services at
new mothers.95
Antidiscrimination concerns might limit the variables that an
AI model could incorporate. The sex of each member of the couple
(including whether the couple is same-sex) may be highly pre-
dictive,96 but there are arguments against considering sex. A regime
that results in more tax rate reductions for women, even if moti-
vated by the good intention of increasing gender equality in the
workforce, would reinforce the stereotype that women prefer car-
ing for children, and thus need inducements to work outside the
home.97 The possibility that AI might perpetuate discrimination has
received great attention recently,98 and this concern may be so
94. See discussion infra note 140 and accompanying text (noting data-based predictions
of income).
95. See supra note 13 and accompanying text.
96. D’VERA COHN ET AL., PEW RES. CTR., AFTER DECADES OF DECLINE, A RISE IN STAY-
AT-HOME MOTHERS 29 (2014), https://www.pewsocialtrends.org/wp-content/uploads/sites/3/
2014/04/moms-at-home_04-08-2014.pdf [https://perma.cc/J42V-GF8X] (presenting survey data
showing that mothers are much more likely than fathers to stop working, take significant
time off, or reduce their work hours to care for children).
97. See Nevada Dep’t of Human Res. v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721, 730-34 (2003) (criticizing
parental-leave policies that privileged maternity leave as reinforcing gender stereotypes).
98. See, e.g., Julia Angwin et al., Machine Bias, PROPUBLICA (May 23, 2016), https://www.
propublica.org/article/machine-bias-risk-assessments-in-criminal-sentencing [https://perma.
cc/J38B-2ZJB]; Kate Crawford, Artificial Intelligence’s White Guy Problem, N.Y. TIMES (June
25, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/06/26/opinion/sunday/artificial-intelligences-white-
guy-problem.html [https://perma.cc/YL9M-E4C6].
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weighty that some strategies offered by private intermediaries
should be prohibited. Such concerns are a fertile area for future
scholars.
Beyond childcare, private intermediaries offering alternative
tax regimes could improve efficiency by granting other deductions
or exclusions that entice taxpayers into the workforce or into ac-
cepting higher-paying jobs. Some possible examples among many
include targeted deductions for home office expenses,99 the cost of
work clothing,100 and commuting expenses.101 Such expenses are
often not currently deductible under the theory that these expenses
are usually mostly personal, but that may vary across taxpayers and
expenses.102 The tax code seeks to accommodate this, sometimes
allowing partial deductibility103 and at other times making fine
distinctions about what is personal and what is not.104 But private
intermediaries might account for individual circumstances, such as
the importance of clothing to particular jobs or the availability of
housing near a workplace. Alternative tax regimes, meanwhile,
need not make a binary decision between allowing a deduction and
disallowing it. Rather, an alternative tax regime might result in
partial deductibility of certain expenses,105 in exchange for a small
increase in tax rates.
99. See I.R.C. § 280A(c)(1) (2012) (allowing deductions for limited home office expenses).
For example, a lawyer who has children might be enticed to continue practicing by allowing
deductions relating to adding and maintaining an alcove in an existing children’s playroom
as a home office, which would not currently be deductible. Id. (requiring that use be “ex-
clusive”).
100. See Pevsner v. Comm’r, 628 F.2d 467, 471 (5th Cir. 1980) (disallowing deductions for
employee purchases of job-required clothing in just about all situations).
101. See Comm’r v. Flowers, 326 U.S. 465, 471 (1946) (relying on predecessor to I.R.C.
§ 262, denying deduction for personal, family, and living expenses). Similarly, consider a
taxpayer who has a more promising job in another state, but who is held back from moving
due to negative home equity in her house. There could be an exclusion from such a taxpayer’s
gross income when the new employer repays the taxpayer’s negative home equity, which
currently is not excludable. See I.R.C. §§ 217(b)(1), 132(a)(6), (g).
102. See Flowers, 326 U.S. at 471.
103. I.R.C. § 274(n) (2012) (allowing deduction for only 50 percent of most business meal
expenses).
104. Compare Pevsner, 628 F.2d at 471 (deductibility of cost of clothing worn to work
determined based on objective standards), with Bernardo v. Comm’r, 88 T.C.M. (CCH) 191,
196 (2004) (using subjective standards for same).
105. See I.R.C. § 274(n) (allowing part deductibility of most business meals); Klein, supra
note 70, at 1100 (arguing for such bifurcation with business travel expenses).
2020] CONTRACTUAL TAX REFORM 1559
B. Accommodating Other Sources of Heterogeneity
The previous Section discussed how private intermediaries might
offer alternative tax regimes that change the tax base to accom-
modate taxpayers’ diverse situations, such as preferences for
business travel or for working outside the home. This Section
considers alternative tax regimes that accommodate diverse tax-
payer preferences in more radical ways than just changing the tax
base. Specifically, this Section addresses two common sources of
taxpayer diversity: differences in earnings potential and differences
in preferences for work versus leisure. As in the previous Section,
the alternative tax regimes should aim to increase the taxpayers’
utility (the overall satisfaction they derive from their work, leisure,
and posttax earnings), while resulting in at least as much tax
revenue to the government.
1. Earnings Potential
A central shortcoming of existing tax systems is that the govern-
ment observes only taxpayers’ income.106 Income is the product of
both effort and earnings potential, yet the government generally
cannot measure either.107 How much of a taxpayer’s earnings were
due to her earnings potential (which the economics literature gen-
erally calls “ability”),108 and how much were due to her efforts? The
government generally cannot tell. If the government knew each
taxpayer’s earnings potential, it could implement the “first-best”
system wherein each taxpayer’s only tax burden would be a lump
sum based on earnings potential.109 Such lump-sum taxes would be
efficient, since the marginal tax rate would be zero, removing tax
distortions on work decisions.110 This approach would be equitable
106. See J. A. Mirrlees, An Exploration in the Theory of Optimum Income Taxation, 38 REV.
ECON. STUD. 175, 175 (1971).
107. See, e.g., id. at 176, 207; see also N. Gregory Mankiw et al., Optimal Taxation in
Theory and Practice, 23 J. ECON. PERSP. 147, 161 (2009) (“Mirrlees ... identified the heart of
the problem of tax design to be the tax authority’s lack of information about individuals’
abilities.”).
108. Mirrlees, supra note 106, at 177.
109. Mankiw et al., supra note 107, at 149-50.
110. See id. at 149.
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too, imposing higher burdens on those most able to pay.111 For
example, a surgeon might be charged a single lump-sum $100,000
tax bill and then pay zero additional tax, preventing tax from
distorting her work decisions.
But because the government cannot measure earnings poten-
tial,112 such a first-best system is impossible. Yet the tax system can
be improved by incorporating estimates of earnings potential.113
George Akerlof famously proposed using easily observable personal
characteristics—which he called “tags”—that correlate with a tax-
payer’s earnings potential to adjust the tax burden.114 Examples of
“tags” that could be used include educational attainment, earnings
history, age, and I.Q.115 Taxpayers possessing characteristics
associated with higher earnings potential would have higher tax
rates than those without the characteristic.116 The underlying theory
is that those with higher earnings potential can earn more with less
effort, and so total social utility is maximized by charging higher
taxes on those with higher earnings potential.117
N. Gregory Mankiw and Matthew Weinzierl applied tagging to
height.118 Being taller correlates with earnings potential, with every
111. See id. at 149-50.
112. See supra note 107 and accompanying text.
113. Economists have developed mechanisms beyond those discussed in the main text,
though often complex and impractical ones, to allow sorting. For example, Joseph Stiglitz has
proposed using the threat of randomizing tax rates for those who appear to the government
to have low earnings potential, while not randomizing rates for those who declare themselves
to have high earnings potential. See Stiglitz, supra note 8, at 214-15. Under the reasonable
assumption that those with higher earnings potential are more risk averse, this ran-
domization encourages high-earnings-potential individuals to fulfill their full potential,
contributing more to the economy and to tax revenues. Those additional tax revenues can
compensate the lower-earnings-potential individuals so they are better off despite the
randomization. See id.
114. George A. Akerlof, The Economics of “Tagging” as Applied to the Optimal Income Tax,
Welfare Programs, and Manpower Planning, 68 AM. ECON. REV. 8, 8 (1978).
115. Mirrlees, supra note 106, at 175 (identifying some possible types of “tagging,” thus
laying the groundwork for Akerlof ’s “tagging” analysis); see Mankiw et al., supra note 107,
at 161-62 (noting that Mirrlees laid the groundwork for tagging).
116. Akerlof, supra note 114, at 9 (explaining how tagging allows “support for the poor with
less distortion to the tax structure”).
117. There are various different utility functions that a social planner might aim to
maximize, although the most common is maximizing total social utility (which is the same as
average social utility). See Mankiw et al., supra note 107, at 148.
118. N. Gregory Mankiw & Matthew Weinzierl, The Optimal Taxation of Height: A Case
Study of Utilitarian Income Redistribution, 2 AM. ECON. J.: ECON. POL’Y 155, 156 (2010); see
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additional inch of height as an adult being associated with a 1.8
percent increase in wages.119 Because tall people can earn income
more easily than short people, the authors suggested, total economic
utility would be maximized by charging higher income tax rates on
taller people than on shorter people.120 Such tagging would redistrib-
ute income from the tall to the short, thus improving equity, while
improving efficiency by equalizing the marginal benefits of con-
sumption across people.121
Mankiw and Weinzierl leave open the possibility that the seeming
absurdity of their proposal reveals a flaw in the dominant utilitar-
ian optimal taxation framework.122 Their proposal may simply
highlight that the tax system generally does not consider informa-
tion other than income, because most such information would be far
more difficult to collect than height.123 A limitation of tagging is that
it provides taxpayers no incentives to reveal hidden information.124
Tagging depends on observable information.125 The tax authority
would need to require taxpayers to reveal information that taxpay-
ers may consider personal, and the tax authority would also need to
enforce honest reporting.126
By contrast, allowing private intermediaries to offer alternative
tax regimes would encourage taxpayers to reveal information in
also Alberto Alesina et al., Gender-Based Taxation and the Division of Family Chores, 3 AM.
ECON. J.: ECON. POL’Y 1, 4 (2011) (applying tagging to gender, with men receiving higher
marginal tax rates).
119. Nicola Persico et al., The Effect of Adolescent Experience on Labor Market Outcomes:
The Case of Height, 112 J. POL. ECON. 1019, 1020-21 (2004). This finding is based on the
wages of white adult males, to avoid differences in race and gender. See id. at 1021; see also
Timothy A. Judge & Daniel M. Cable, The Effect of Physical Height on Workplace Success and
Income: Preliminary Test of a Theoretical Model, 89 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 428, 428 (2004)
(finding similar results when controlling for gender, weight, and age).
120. See Mankiw & Weinzierl, supra note 118, at 174.
121. See id. at 174-75.
122. The utilitarian framework does not seem to leave any role for considerations of
horizontal equity. See, e.g., id. at 174. But Mankiw and Weinzierl ask rhetorically: “Why
would society sacrifice potentially large gains for its average member to preserve equal
treatment of individuals within an arbitrarily-defined group?” Id. at 175.
123. See id. at 174.
124. See id. at 150 (discussing the need to prevent inducing those of high ability to pretend
not to be).
125. See Akerlof, supra note 114, at 8 (identifying the characteristics used in “tagging”).
126. See Mankiw & Weinzierl, supra note 118, at 174 (explaining why some taxpayers may
not want to reveal certain information relevant to “tagging”).
1562 WILLIAM & MARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 61:1537
two ways. First, taxpayers would implicitly reveal a great deal of
information by deciding whether to opt into an alternative tax
regime that a private intermediary has offered them. Second, the
private intermediaries can require taxpayers to provide private
information (for example, their college major and GPA) as a pre-
requisite for being allowed to opt into an alternative tax regime.
Contractual tax reform thus provides a systematic framework for
revealing and using such information, while still leaving taxpayers
with the option of not sharing information at all, if they so choose.
Another explanation for the existing tax system’s failure to
embrace tagging is that it generally involves taking from one group
(for example, the tall) and giving to another group (for example, the
short).127 In other words, tagging is Kaldor-Hicks efficient, increas-
ing total social utility, but tagging is generally not Pareto efficient,
since some taxpayers (for example, the tall) lose from the policy.128
Politically, tagging is difficult to implement, because high-earnings-
potential groups like the tall and the educated will be motivated to
organize politically to fight it.129 By contrast, contractual tax reform
is Pareto efficient because taxpayers must opt in, and only those
taxpayers who foresee that an alternative tax regime will leave
them better off will opt in. Thus, this opting in can separate out
high-earnings-potential taxpayers from those with low earnings
potential.
Consider the following example. Suppose for simplicity that the
default tax system130 has just two tax brackets: all taxable income
between zero dollars and $50,000 is taxed at 10 percent, while all
taxable income above $50,000 is taxed at 40 percent. Consider two
individuals who both make $100,000 per year: H, who has high
earnings potential, and L, who has low earnings potential. To earn
this income despite having low earnings potential, L toils long
hours; meanwhile, H earns this income working only modest hours.
127. See id.
128. Mankiw and Weinzierl show that height-sensitive taxation could be Pareto efficient
relative to a regime that does not take height into account, but that the magnitude of the
Pareto improvement would be small, with Pareto improving height-based taxes only a few
dollars. Id. at 173.
129. Perhaps largely for this reason, tagging’s use has largely been restricted to negative
taxation, such as welfare benefits. See Mankiw et al., supra note 107, at 163.
130. Current U.S. federal income tax has seven tax brackets. See I.R.C. § 1(a)-(d), (i) (2012).
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For L, we assume that a lower marginal rate would be unlikely to
induce harder work, since L is already working quite hard and the
disutility from cutting into L’s scarce remaining free time would
discourage further effort. But for H, a lower marginal rate could
quite likely induce harder work, since H is not currently working
hard and, being high-earnings-potential, can earn additional money
with relatively little additional effort.
Suppose that both H and L were offered an alternative tax regime
that involved a lump-sum payment of $20,000, plus a mere 10
percent marginal tax rate on all income. This alternative rate
schedule is a simple example of higher inframarginal rates and
lower marginal rates. How would H and L react?
Two diagrams explain their reactions. These diagrams build on
the existing economic literature that models taxpayers’ preferences
for after-tax income versus leisure.131 These models make the
generally reasonable assumption that taxpayers derive more utility
from both having more after-tax income and more leisure.132 For any
taxpayer and any level of achievable utility, a convex function called
an “indifference curve” represents all combinations of pretax income
(which is earned by a combination of effort and earnings potential)
and after-tax income (which is available for consumption) that
achieve the same level of utility.133 The higher the indifference
curve, the higher the level of utility achieved by the taxpayer.134
Figure 1 illustrates high-earnings-potential H ’s behavior under
both existing law and the alternative regime. The horizontal axis is
pretax income and the vertical axis is the income left after taxes,
available for consumption. The dashed line is the existing tax-rate
schedule. This line is “kinked” because the existing tax-rate
schedule in our hypothetical has two different brackets: 10 percent
and then 40 percent. The slope of this tax schedule is 0.9 up to
$50,000 in pretax income (because the government takes the
remaining 0.1 or 10 percent), but then has the “kink,” taking the
131. Stiglitz, supra note 8, at 216-18.
132. Id. at 216 (assuming “ Ui/ Ci > 0,” which means utility U goes up as consumption C
(that is, after-tax income) goes up, and assuming that “ Ui/ Li < 0,” which means utility U
goes down as hours worked L (which “could equally well be interpreted as being effort”) goes
up).
133. Id. at 214.
134. Id. at 217-18.
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slope 0.6 beyond $50,000 (because the government takes the re-
maining 0.4 or 40 percent). By contrast, the straight gray line is the
alternative regime’s tax-rate schedule, which starts at negative
$20,000, because that is the lump-sum payment that must be made
in the alternative regime. The line then has a slope of 0.9 at every
amount of pretax income (because the government always takes the
remaining 10 percent). The two solid black, curved lines are H ’s two
relevant indifference curves.
Figure 1. Model of How High-Earnings-Potential H Responds to
the Alternative Tax Schedule
H benefits from opting into the alternative regime, which
causes H to work harder and earn a pretax income of $120,000,
with $88,000 left after taxes under the alternative regime. This
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combination of higher effort and additional after-tax income (in-
creasing from $75,000 to $88,000) makes H happier, shown by
the higher indifference curve. Meanwhile, the government has
increased the tax it collects from H from $25,000 under existing law
to $32,000 under the alternative tax regime. Allowing H to opt in
results in a win-win for both H and the government.
By contrast, Figure 2 illustrates low-earnings-potential L’s re-
action to the alternative tax regime. The crucial difference is L’s
indifference curve. It is steep, since additional after-tax income does
little to compensate for cutting into L’s already scarce hours of
leisure.135
135. Stiglitz, supra note 8, at 217-18 (“[I]ndividuals of higher ability have flatter in-
difference curves ... the increase in consumption that is required to compensate an individual
for a given increase in before tax income is smaller for the more able, since to obtain the given
increase in before tax income he needs to forgo less leisure.”). Recall that the economics
literature uses the term “ability” where we have been using the term “earnings potential.”
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Figure 2. Model of How Low-Earnings-Potential L Responds to
the Alternative Tax Schedule
The indifference curve that L achieves under current law is
already higher than the alternative regime’s tax schedule, at all
possible levels of pretax income. Being taxed under the alternative
regime would thus lower L’s utility, so L will not be interested in
opting into the alternative tax regime. Intuitively, L already works
so hard to earn $100,000 in pretax income that the alternative rate
schedule would leave L worse off (hence, L will not opt in).
By offering the same alternative rate schedule to both H and L—
both of whom currently earn $100,000—a private intermediary
can determine who has high earnings potential and who has low
earnings potential. Moreover, the alternative rate schedule simul-
taneously makes H happier and raises more tax revenue from H.
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The danger in offering such an alternative tax schedule is that
opportunistic taxpayers might take advantage of it. Suppose that
opportunistic taxpayer O earns $100,000 before taxes, but knows
that his income is about to shoot upwards to $200,000 next year
because of a coming promotion. Offering the alternative tax regime
to O would result in a windfall for O at the expense of government
revenues.136 This is where AI plays a role. AI can help identify which
taxpayers might increase their work effort for higher after-tax pay,
and which taxpayers are likely to receive salary increases regardless
of tax regime. The private intermediary has a strong financial
incentive to find data and analyze it using AI to distinguish O from
H and L—and to not invite O to opt into the alternative tax regime.
2. Work Versus Leisure Preferences
Even taxpayers with identical earnings potential may differ in
their preferences for leisure versus after-tax income. Contractual
tax reform can accommodate this diversity to offer alternative tax
regimes that leave both taxpayers and the government better off.
Suppose for simplicity—as in the previous Section—that the exist-
ing tax system has just two tax brackets: all taxable income between
zero dollars and $50,000 is taxed at 10 percent, while all taxable in-
come above $50,000 is taxed at 40 percent. Assume that under the
existing tax system, taxpayers A and B both maximize their utili-
ty by putting in forty hours of effort, thus earning $100,000 in
taxable income and paying $25,000 in taxes.137 A private interme-
diary offers both an alternative tax regime with a single, flat rate
of 25 percent on all income. This alternative tax regime imposes
the exact same tax liability—$25,000—on the taxpayers if they
continue to earn $100,000. But they may not.
136. Under generally applicable tax law, O would have to pay taxes of 10 percent on the
first $50,000 of income (that is, $5000) plus 40 percent on the remaining $150,000 (that is,
$60,000), for a total of $65,000. By contrast, under the alternative tax regime, O would have
to pay the lump sum of $20,000 plus 10 percent of the $200,000 income (that is, $20,000), for
a total of only $40,000, which is a $25,000 windfall to O.
137. Ten percent times the first $50,000 in income results in $5000 in taxes. Forty percent
times the next $50,000 in income results in $20,000 in taxes. Adding the $5000 and $20,000
in taxes gives total taxes of $25,000.
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Assume that A opts into this alternative regime and maximizes
her utility by working ten more hours per week, thus earning
$120,000 instead of $100,000. This outcome would result in $5,000
in additional tax revenues and $15,000 in additional after-tax
money for A. It is a win-win for tax revenues and for A. This ex-
ample demonstrates how offering alternative tax regimes can
increase the work incentives of those taxpayers for whom lower
marginal rates—and hence a higher return to additional work—
would be worth the reduction of leisure. In effect, A has received
lower marginal rates on additional income (decreased to 25 percent
from 40 percent) in exchange for higher rates on her inframargin-
al income (increased to 25 percent from 10 percent on the first
$50,000).
Suppose that B declines to opt into the alternative tax regime.
Why might B not opt in? B may simply not have the opportunity to
earn more than $100,000 under any circumstances. Maybe B has a
salaried government job that does not allow for bonuses, meaning
B would have to change jobs to earn more than $100,000. Maybe B
is covered by a collective bargaining agreement fixing hours and
compensation. B may also have time commitments outside of work
(for example, children or hobbies) that make working more than
forty hours unacceptable. Regardless of the reason, the alternative
tax regime has caused A and B to reveal their divergent preferences
for after-tax income versus leisure, with A, B, and tax revenues all
left either just as well off or better off.
Two simple diagrams below demonstrate how A and B can have
different preferences for after-tax income versus leisure—and thus
why A chooses the alternative tax regime while B does not. Figure
3 illustrates A’s behavior under both existing law and the alterna-
tive regime. The diagram is similar to Figures 1 and 2, except that
the alternative tax regime’s rate schedule is different, represented
below by the straight gray line. This line has a slope of 0.75 at every
amount of pretax income (because the government always takes the
remaining 0.25 or 25 percent).
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Figure 3. Model of How A Responds to Alternative Tax Schedule
Under existing law, A maximizes her utility by working so that
the existing rate schedule (that is, the “kinked” dashed line) in-
tersects her highest possible indifference curve (corresponding to
highest possibility utility). A does this by working enough to earn
$100,000 in pretax income, leaving her with $75,000 in after-tax
income. But with the alternative rate schedule (the gray line), there
is a higher indifference curve that intersects the gray line, where A
earns $120,000 in pretax income, leaving her with $90,000 in after-
tax income. A would opt into the alternative regime, choosing to
work the extra ten hours per week and getting more utility.
Why would B not opt into the alternative regime?138 Figure 4 il-
lustrates why. B ’s indifference curves are quite different than A’s.
138. Most of the tax literature assumes, unrealistically, that all taxpayers have the same
utility functions with respect to after-tax income and leisure. See BOADWAY, supra note 7, at
186. Contractual tax reform relaxes this unrealistic assumption.
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Figure 4. Model of Why B Does Not Choose Alternative Tax
Schedule
The indifference curve that includes B ’s current work choice has
a “kink” at a pretax income of $100,000, so that earning any more
than $100,000 would require much higher after-tax income to result
in the same utility. The alternative rate schedule does not intersect
any higher indifference curve, meaning that there is no way that the
alternative regime can give B a higher utility than existing law. As
a result, B will not opt into the alternative regime, thus reveal-
ing—and accommodating—B ’s different preferences from A.
Opportunistic taxpayers might try to take advantage of the option
of the alternative regime to minimize taxes. For example, suppose
that taxpayer C currently earns $100,000, just like A and B, subject
to $25,000 in tax under the existing rate schedules. But suppose
that C knew that her employer was already planning to raise her
compensation from $100,000 to $120,000 next year, without C
needing to work any harder. When viewed in terms of the model
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presented in Figures 3 and 4, C ’s impending pay raise results in a
shift of C ’s “indifference curves” to the right, as the same amount of
effort results in greater pretax income. C could opportunistically opt
into the alternative tax regime with a flat 25 percent rate, and save
$3000 in taxes with no additional effort.139 If offered to C, the al-
ternative tax regime is not Pareto efficient, giving C a windfall at
the expense of government tax revenues.
Private intermediaries would have an incentive to use all avail-
able data and AI to identify taxpayers such as C and not to offer
them the opportunity to opt into this alternative tax regime. For
example, taxpayers such as A and B may be in professions with
stable incomes, whereas C ’s profession may offer frequent upticks
in compensation. As another example, C may have just completed
a new professional certification that would naturally foreshadow a
pay increase, or C may have engaged in behavior consistent with
someone expecting an increase in earnings, such as taking title to
a new luxury car.
Using computer models to predict incomes has already been a
reality for nearly a decade. Experian PLC, one of the credit-
reporting agencies, introduced a service in 2011 called Income
Insight that predicts an individual’s income, based solely on credit-
report data, without even seeing the individual’s tax returns.140 AI
drawing from even more data, including complete tax histories,
credit reports, vehicle registrations, and various other government
records, could predict next year’s income still more accurately.141 AI
could predict not only future income, but also the probability of a
substantial jump in income, such as the one C expected in the
example above. Private intermediaries would have a strong in-
centive to obtain relevant data from taxpayers and train their AI
models properly to identify such taxpayers—and not offer them
the alternative regime.
139. Recall that we assumed that current law imposed a 10 percent rate on the first
$50,000 of income and then 40 percent on all income above $50,000; under that schedule,
$120,000 in income would result in $33,000 in taxes. But under the alternative regime all
income would be taxed at 25 percent; $120,000 in income would result in just $30,000 in taxes.
140. Scott Thurm, Data Mining Your Mind—The Next Frontier Is Predicting Personal
Behavior; The ‘Ability to Pay’ Index, WALL ST. J., Oct. 27, 2011, at B1.
141. See supra notes 11-16 for a discussion of AI.
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This example demonstrates an important point: the AI used
by private intermediaries need not be perfect for contractual tax
reform to make society better off. When taxpayers like A opt into
an alternative regime, then the economic “pie” gets bigger: A ends
up with higher utility, and the government ends up with more tax
revenue than otherwise ($5000 in the example above). If a taxpayer
like C is accidentally allowed to opt into the alternative regime the
economic pie does not get smaller. Rather, a slice of the pie ($3000
in the example above) is transferred to C, who pays less in taxes.142
The increased tax collections from A more than offset the lost tax
from C, while both A and C are left better off.
Private intermediaries might use a number of other creative
strategies to prevent opportunistic taxpayer behavior like C ’s above.
For example, some jobs produce reliable metrics of effort, such as
factory workers’ hours clocked or law-firm lawyers’ hours billed.143
For taxpayers with such jobs, the alternative tax regime might
provide the lower marginal rates only if the taxpayer demonstrates
an increase in hours worked. This example highlights a broader
point: the current one-size-fits-all approach to tax law is constrained
by the feasibility of obtaining information, whereas contractual tax
reform allows alternative tax regimes to be available only to tax-
payers for whom relevant information is available. For such tax-
payers, an alternative tax regime can create a win-win for both the
taxpayers and the government.
142. Indeed, suppose that the alternative tax regime in the example were offered to A, B,
and C. Of these, B would not opt in because of the “kinked” indifference curves discussed
above. But A and C would both opt in, with the government gaining $5000 in additional taxes
from A and losing $3000 by giving a tax windfall to C. The government comes out overall with
$2000 in additional tax revenues.
143. Optimal tax literature generally assumes that the government cannot directly observe
taxpayers’ effort. See, e.g., Mankiw et al., supra note 107, at 150 (“The planner can observe
income, which depends on both ability and effort, but the planner can observe neither ability
nor effort directly.”). Recall that the economics literature uses the term “ability” where we
have been using the term “earnings potential.” Although true for many professions, this
assumption may not be quite accurate for those taxpayers whose hours are clocked.
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C. Reducing Waste
1. Saving on Compliance Costs
The current tax system has staggeringly large compliance costs:
not only in amounts paid directly to tax preparers and tax software
providers, but also taxpayers’ time. Although estimates vary based
on methodologies, complying with the tax code likely costs the U.S.
economy between $150 billion and $250 billion per year.144 Although
contractual tax reform will itself entail some transaction costs—as
do all contracts—alternative tax regimes could simplify the tax code
and reduce total compliance costs. Scholars and policymakers have
proposed many ways to make tax compliance less costly.145 But
uncertainty, inertia, gridlock, and special interests have prevented
implementation.146 Contractual tax reform could bypass this inertia
and unlock savings from tax simplification by allowing taxpayers to
opt into alternative tax regimes—many likely based on preexisting
work by tax scholars—that simplify compliance.
144. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-05-878, TAX POLICY: SUMMARY OF ESTIMATES
OF THE COSTS OF THE FEDERAL TAX SYSTEM (2005), https://www.gao.gov/products/gao-05-878
[https://perma.cc/JP7J-62NS] (estimating 2005 compliance costs of $107 billion, likely lower
than current costs due to inflation and increased tax code complexity); DEMIAN BRADY, NAT’L
TAXPAYERS UNION FOUND., TAX COMPLEXITY 2016: THE INCREASING COMPLIANCE BURDENS OF
THE TAX CODE (Apr. 18, 2016), https://docs.google.com/gview?url=http://www.ntu.org/library/
doclib/Tax-Complexity-Report-04-18-2016.pdf [https://perma.cc/M5UQ-LKBE] (estimating cur-
rent compliance costs at $234.4 billion); JASON J. FICHTNER & JACOB M. FELDMAN, MERCATUS
RESEARCH, THE HIDDEN COSTS OF TAX COMPLIANCE 5 (2013), https://www.mercatus.org/
system/files/Fichtner_TaxCompliance_v3.pdf [https://perma.cc/AVF8-3UPL] (using broader
definition of costs and reaching U.S. estimates ranging between $215 billion and $987 billion).
145. See, e.g., WILLIAM G. GALE, BROOKINGS INSTITUTION, FIXING THE TAX SYSTEM: SUPPORT
FAIRER, SIMPLER, AND MORE ADEQUATE TAXATION (2007), https://www.brookings.edu/wp-
content/uploads/2016/06/PB_TaxPolicy_Gale.pdf [https://perma.cc/3QSC-PCBN]; Joseph M.
Dodge, Some Income Tax Simplification Proposals, 41 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 71, 71-73 (2013)
(providing several dozen proposals).
146. See Liz Day, The TurboTax Trap: How the Maker of TurboTax Fought Free, Simple
Tax Filing, PROPUBLICA (Mar. 26, 2013, 5:00 AM), https://www.propublica.org/article/how-the-
maker-of-turbotax-fought-free-simple-tax-filing [https://perma.cc/LY5N-532E] (noting that
Intuit and other return-preparers have fought tax simplification moves); James C. Gould, Tax
Reform, Congress, and Politics, 146 TAX NOTES 983, 990 (2015) (“[T]he highly visible base-
broadening side of a major tax reform bill has the capacity to anger interest groups rep-
resenting nearly every part of the population and every region of the country.”); Farhad
Manjoo, Would You Let the I.R.S. Prepare Your Taxes?, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 15, 2015), https://
www.nytimes.com/2015/04/16/technology/personaltech/turbotax-or-irs-as-tax-preparer-intuit-
has-a-favorite.html [https://perma.cc/B759-9M5P].
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For example, a bewildering array of tax provisions govern retire-
ment savings, creating compliance burdens for taxpayers, their em-
ployers, and financial institutions handling retirement accounts.147
These provisions could be greatly simplified.148 Similarly, taxpayers
currently must calculate their tax liability twice, once using the
normal rules, and again using the different rules of the alternative
minimum tax.149 An alternative tax regime could provide a single ro-
bust set of rules and a single set of rates, requiring calculating li-
ability only once.
2. Closing the “Tax Gap”
The IRS currently collects only approximately 84 percent of
taxes due.150 The uncollected 16 percent, about $400 billion per
year,151 is the “tax gap.”152 The largest component of the tax gap
is underreporting of gross income by individuals or self-employed
business owners.153 Taxpayers who receive wages or salaries have
147. Dodge, supra note 145, at 123-34.
148. There is bipartisan support for simplifying the mishmash of tax rules governing
retirement. See Zachary Abate, Legislative Outlook: Hearings on Tax Returns, Retirement
Security Planned, 2019 TAX NOTES TODAY 23-9 (Feb. 4, 2019) (noting that the new Democratic
chair of the House Ways and Means Committee plans to reintroduce the Retirement Plan
Simplification and Enhancement Act of 2017 in the new Congress).
149. I.R.C. §§ 55-59 (2012) (imposing alternative minimum tax (AMT) and mandating
differences in calculation). See generally Lisa Marie Starczewski, Portfolio 587: Noncorporate
Alternative Minimum Tax (3d ed. 2019) (BNA) (giving overview of AMT as applied to in-
dividuals and other noncorporate taxpayers). Recent tax reform legislation has reduced but
not eliminated the likelihood of the AMT applying to an individual taxpayer.
150. INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., TAX GAP ESTIMATES FOR TAX YEARS 2008-2010, at 1 (2016),
https://www.irs.gov/pub/newsroom/tax%20gap%20estimates%20for%202008%20through%
202010.pdf [https://perma.cc/9FH4-F57P]. These are the latest years for which data are
available given the length of time required to audit taxpayers and resolve disputes. See also
William Hoffman, Tax Gap Widens, While Compliance Rate Falls, 151 TAX NOTES 586, 586
(2016) (discussing this IRS tax-gap estimates release).
151. INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., supra note 150, at 1 (estimating the net tax gap, which is
the gap never ultimately collected even after IRS enforcement actions, as $406 billion).
152. Id. (discussing the definition of the “tax gap”).
153. There are three basic components of the tax gap: (1) taxpayers who do not file tax
returns as required; (2) underreporting of tax liability on filed returns; and (3) taxpayers who
underpay the liabilities shown on their returns. See id. at 3 att.1. Category (2) is far and away
the largest, and it has two large subcomponents that correspond directly to underreporting
by individuals who own businesses and/or are self-employed: $125 billion in individuals
underreporting the income tax due on their business income, and $65 billion by self-employed
individuals underreporting the Social Security and Medicare taxes (self-employment tax) due
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an extraordinarily high level of compliance,154 because their em-
ployers are required to send a W-2 listing their gross income to the
IRS,155 which cross-checks the W-2 against the tax return by
matching the Social Security number.156 By contrast, business
owners and the self-employed are generally not subject to infor-
mation reporting such as the W-2, and their underreporting is the
largest component of the tax gap.157 Increased information report-
ing requirements on business owners and the self-employed are
widely recognized as central to reducing the tax gap.158
Contractual tax reform could help close the tax gap in two ways.
First, private intermediaries would have an incentive to offer low-
compliance-group taxpayers alternative tax regimes that arrange
for stringent information reporting, in exchange for lower tax rates.
For example, an alternative tax regime offered to a shopkeeper
could involve both the cash register and the credit card reader
reporting all transactions to the private intermediary via the In-
ternet—potentially reinforced by having a video camera recording
all activity in the store to ensure that no cash is paid “under the
counter.” In exchange, the shopkeeper could receive lower rates or
some other benefit such as a simplified tax system. Research shows
that many taxpayers who underreport their taxes would like to be
on their income. Id.
154. Id. at 2 (stating that “income ... subject to substantial information reporting and
withholding,” which includes wages and salaries, results in only 1 percent of the total
underreporting for Individual Income Taxes).
155. I.R.C. §§ 6041, 6051; Treas. Reg. § 1.6041-2(a) (2019). The requirement to file W-2s
is backed up by fines and up to one year in jail time. I.R.C. §§ 6674, 7204.
156. Beverly Bird, How Often Does the IRS Double Check Tax Returns?, ZACKS (Mar. 11,
2019), https://finance.zacks.com/irs-double-check-tax-returns-8650.html [https://perma.cc/
RN9A-EUJK].
157. INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., supra note 150, at 5 att.3 (demonstrating that “[i]ncome
subject to little or no information reporting,” which “[i]ncludes nonfarm proprietor income,
other income, rents and royalties, farm income, Form 4797 income,” results in 63 percent of
total underreporting for Individual Income Taxes); accord U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF.,
GAO-16-92T, FISCAL OUTLOOK: ADDRESSING IMPROPER PAYMENTS AND THE TAX GAP WOULD
IMPROVE THE GOVERNMENT’S FISCAL POSITION (2015), https://www.gao.gov/assets/680/
672884.pdf [https://perma.cc/SS32-CBGW] (“Where there is little or no information reporting,
such as with business income, taxpayers tend to significantly misreport their income.”).
158. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., supra note 157, at 35; DEP’T OF THE TREASURY,
GENERAL EXPLANATIONS OF THE ADMINISTRATION’S FISCAL YEAR 2017 REVENUE PROPOSALS
198-201 (2016), https://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/tax-policy/Documents/General-Ex
planations-FY2017.pdf [https://perma.cc/8HPP-WFQ8] (proposing two information-reporting
requirement reforms to reduce the tax gap).
1576 WILLIAM & MARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 61:1537
in full compliance but do not comply because they feel that their
competitors do not comply.159 Such taxpayers might happily opt into
an alternative tax regime with higher monitoring, but lower tax
rates.
Second, contractual tax reform could allow the IRS to focus its
limited enforcement resources on taxpayers least likely to be
compliant: those to whom private intermediaries offered alterna-
tive regimes involving more monitoring, but who declined to opt
in.160 Merely offering the alternative regime causes taxpayers to
reveal information about themselves, and this information could be
used to better focus audit resources.161 This benefit stands in stark
contrast to most of the benefits we have already discussed, which
are Pareto-efficient, leaving the government, each taxpayer, and the
private intermediary no worse off than before (and often better off).
Allowing the IRS to focus enforcement resources on taxpayers who
decline to opt into alternative regimes involving more substantia-
tion will be detrimental for those taxpayers. But this detriment to
low-compliance taxpayers will likely benefit society as a whole by
increasing compliance rates.
D. Opening the Overton Window
As these examples suggest, private intermediaries might embrace
ideas that are well beyond the range of political plausibility, that
are outside the “Overton window” of acceptable political discourse.162
159. Leandra Lederman, The Interplay Between Norms and Enforcement in Tax Com-
pliance, 64 OHIO ST. L.J. 1453, 1504-06 (2003); Susan Cleary Morse et al., Cash Businesses
and Tax Evasion, 20 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 37, 40-41 (2009); see Christopher Bergin, CID to
Employment Tax Evaders: ‘We Will Catch You’, 91 TAX NOTES 1220, 1221 (2001) (“[S]ome
employers turn to evading taxes to stay competitive in their industry.”).
160. Economists have developed many auditing strategies with the goal of optimizing tax
law enforcement. See, e.g., Parkash Chander & Louis L. Wilde, A General Characterization
of Optimal Income Tax Enforcement, 65 REV. ECON. STUD. 165, 167, 180 (1998). Yet none of
these mechanisms has the simplicity of the opt-in of contractual tax reform.
161. Cf. Raskolnikov, supra note 7, at 671 (proposing requiring taxpayers to choose be-
tween higher penalties or a more cooperative enforcement regime including binding ar-
bitration).
162. See A Brief Explanation of the Overton Window, MACKINAC CTR. FOR PUB. POL’Y,
https://www.mackinac.org/OvertonWindow [https://perma.cc/92HS-ZXS6] (describing Joseph
Overton’s theory that current legal change depends on what is considered plausible, but that
this might change over time).
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Private intermediaries could offer alternative tax regimes that are
radically different from the current system. The progressive econ-
omist Dean Baker has argued that instead of taxing corporations
based on their pretax profits,163 the government should become mi-
nority shareholders in corporate enterprises.164 Under this proposal,
the government would receive nonvoting shares in an amount
designed to provide the same revenues as the corporate tax, and the
corporation would then be entirely free from paying corporate tax-
es.165 The corporation would no longer have an incentive to hire le-
gions of well-paid tax advisors to take economically distortionary
steps to minimize taxes.166
This proposal is not a radical departure economically, as the
government is effectively already a passive minority shareholder in
every entity that pays taxes.167 But it would be a radical departure
institutionally and legally. If this reform were implemented in gen-
erally applicable law, it would run into legal obstacles such as the
Fifth Amendment’s Takings Clause.168 Moreover, implementing this
reform for all corporations at once would be risky, because it might
not produce as much tax revenue in the short term as the current
corporate tax system.169 This reform, however, could be offered as
163. See, e.g., I.R.C. § 11(a)-(b) (2012) (imposing a 21 percent tax on the taxable income of
corporations).
164. Dean Baker, Get Rid of Corporate Taxes, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 13, 2016, at A21 (noting
that such a proposal has “been a popular ‘what if ’ among academic economists for years” but
had not been brought “into the light of policy discussions”). For discussion of how the
government might itself experiment with such a reform without the help of private tax
providers, see Abramowicz, supra note 49, at 93-95.
165. See Baker, supra note 164.
166. See id. 
167. See Mihir A. Desai et al., Theft and Taxes, 84 J. FIN. ECON. 591, 592 (2007) (“The state,
thanks to its tax claim on cash flows, is de facto the largest minority shareholder in almost
all corporations.”).
168. See U.S. CONST. amend. V; Starr Int’l Co. v. United States, 106 Fed. Cl. 50, 72-75
(2012), vacated in part, 856 F.3d 953 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (holding that forcing company to issue
preferred stock was cognizable under the Takings Clause); cf. Swisher Int’l, Inc. v. Schafer,
550 F.3d 1046, 1055 (11th Cir. 2008) (finding that Takings Clause did not apply to a
regulatory scheme); Adams v. United States, 391 F.3d 1212, 1224-25 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (finding
a depositor in a bank account protected under the Takings Clause).
169. Corporations might react by avoiding paying dividends, with the corporation retaining
cash, thus benefitting shareholders as the value of the stock went up. The nongovernment
shareholders could thus reap the benefits of the corporation’s profits by selling their shares
for the higher prices. Trevir I. Nath, 4 Reasons Investors Like Buybacks, INVESTOPEDIA (Mar.
26, 2019), https://www.investopedia.com/articles/investing/123115/4-reasons-why-investors-
1578 WILLIAM & MARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 61:1537
an alternative tax regime. If indeed it offers substantial efficiency
gains, then it would offer substantial benefits to taxpayers (here,
corporations), the government (through higher revenue), and private
intermediaries that offer it.170 At the same time, it might change the
public conception of what is possible in the tax system, either
opening the Overton window when private regimes prove attractive,
or closing it decisively should they fail.
Other reform proposals outside the current Overton window could
be offered as alternative tax regimes. For example, corporations
might be offered lower corporate rates in exchange for losing the
deduction for interest paid on debt.171 As another example, publicly
traded securities held by individuals for investment could be
marked-to-market, meaning that taxpayers would recognize gains
and losses each year even if they do not sell the securities.172 In
exchange for marking-to-market, taxpayers might get a lower rate
for gains when their securities increase in value. Contractual tax
reform allows experimentation with a nearly endless variety of
possible alternative tax regimes, and it provides private interme-
diaries with incentives to develop alternatives not previously con-
sidered.
buybacks.asp [https://perma.cc/NHX4-33F9]. But the share-price increase would not result
in any cash flow to the government. If the corporation attempted to return cash to
shareholders by redeeming shares (that is, a buy-back), then a pro-rata portion of the
government’s shares would have to be redeemed as well, resulting in cash flow. See id.
170. As with the individual income tax, tax expenditures are a complication. See supra
notes 24-33 and accompanying text. Congress would need to find some other means of
ensuring that target taxpayers fulfill the goals embodied by corporate tax expenditures. See,
e.g., I.R.C. § 199 (2012) (providing a deduction for qualified domestic production activities).
171. I.R.C. § 163(a); see, e.g., JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 101ST CONG., FEDERAL INCOME
TAX ASPECTS OF CORPORATE FINANCIAL STRUCTURES 31-32 (Comm. Print 1989). A tax-reform
bill passed in December 2017, Pub. L. No. 115-97, 131 Stat. 2054 (2017), placed some caps on
the deductibility of business interest. I.R.C. § 163(j); H.R. REP. NO. 115-466, at 385-92 (2017)
(Conf. Rep.) (discussing limitations).
172. For a list of authorities proposing various combinations of mark-to-market treatment
of securities with different applicable rates, see supra note 46. Currently mark-to-market is
normally available solely for securities dealers such as stock brokerages. See I.R.C. § 475; cf.
id. § 1256 (providing mark-to-market on sophisticated financial instruments such as futures
contracts and foreign currency contracts).
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II. IMPLEMENTATION
The previous Part suggested some possible alternative tax
regimes that private intermediaries might offer. These were hy-
pothetical examples; the private intermediaries themselves would
take the initiative in designing alternative tax regimes and deciding
which taxpayers to invite to opt in. Contractual tax reform is
voluntary; private intermediaries decide what alternative regime to
offer and to whom, and invited taxpayers decide whether to opt in.
It thus does not amount to privatization in any conventional sense.
Privatization may enable government agencies to circumvent the
legislative process to accomplish idiosyncratic policy goals,173 but
contractual tax reform does not give government officials discretion.
And while critics argue that privatization is based on a myth “that
markets are more efficient than government,”174 our proposal is
agnostic about in what areas and for which taxpayers private
intermediaries may be able to improve existing law. If private
intermediaries cannot provide an alternative tax regime that leaves
both taxpayers and the government’s coffers better off, tax law and
institutions will simply continue to function as before.
A. Basic Mechanics: Treatment Group and Control Group
A private intermediary—say, “Taxes, Inc.”—would both design
the alternative tax regime and solicit taxpayers to opt into the al-
ternative regime. Some invited taxpayers would simply decline to
opt in. Others might be refused entry by the intermediary based on
further data analysis.175 Of the taxpayers who remain, most (say, 90
percent) would in fact be subject to the alternative tax regime.176
173. See Jon D. Michaels, Privitization’s Pretensions, 77 U. CHI. L. REV. 717, 719 (2010).
174. Matthew Titolo, Privatization and the Market Frame, 60 BUFF. L. REV. 493, 494 (2012).
175. Taxes, Inc. would receive taxpayer information only if taxpayers gave their consent.
Taxpayers’ return data is kept confidential. See I.R.C. § 6103(a); see also BITTKER & LOKKEN,
supra note 38, ¶ 111.4 (discussing § 6103 in depth). Taxpayers might grant permission either
for specific intermediaries or for all intermediaries to consider their information. Even with
permission, private tax intermediaries would need to be bound by the penalties against
unauthorized disclosure or misuse of return information. See I.R.C. § 7213 (criminal penalty);
id. § 7213A (same); id. § 7431 (civil actions).
176. Because the profits to the intermediaries depend on the control group, the percentage
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These taxpayers are the “treatment group,” with their tax treat-
ment specified in the alternative tax regime.
Some percentage (say, 10 percent) of taxpayers who are invited
and who opt in would randomly be assigned to serve as the “control
group,” subject to generally applicable tax law and filing their
returns with the IRS. Taxes, Inc. would be required to ensure that
the government received tax revenues from the treatment group
based on the taxes collected from those in the control group. Given
the percentages in our example, Taxes, Inc. could be required to pay
the government 9.0 times the taxes paid by the control group,177
ensuring revenue neutrality for the government. Alternatively,
Taxes, Inc. could be required to pay the government 9.0 times the
taxes paid by the control group, plus some percentage, set by for-
mula, of any excess collected from the treatment group. This ar-
rangement would make contractual tax reform a potential revenue
raiser for the government, helping to reduce deficits or to fund new
social spending.
B. The Role of Intermediaries
The role of the private tax intermediary is similar to an insurance
company in two fundamental ways: designing a legal instrument
and deciding to whom to offer it.178 Insurers design insurance
policies for a risk pool and then decide who is eligible to buy into
that risk pool.179 Similarly, private tax intermediaries would design
alternative tax regimes and decide who is eligible to opt into the
alternative tax regime. Insurers aim to collect more in premiums
must be sufficiently high to ensure comparisons to the control group are sufficiently reliable
for whatever level of statistical significance the government determines is necessary.
177. The private intermediary’s required payment might be adjusted by various ad-
ministrative expenses that it either imposes on the IRS or relieves the IRS of. For example,
if the intermediary handled auditing and dispute resolution, that would save the IRS the cost
of auditing treatment-group taxpayers and resolving disputes that arose; thus, Taxes, Inc.’s
required payment might be reduced below 9.0 to account for these savings to the U.S.
Treasury.
178. See Keith Evans, What Are the Functions of Insurance Companies?, BIZFLUENT (Sep.
26, 2017), https://bizfluent.com/about-5406767-functions-insurance-companies-.html [https:
//perma.cc/RC5E-CNMK].
179. See id.
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than they pay out on policies.180 Private tax intermediaries would
aim to collect more in taxes from the treatment group than the
control group’s taxes suggests the treatment group would have paid.
Both insurers and private tax intermediaries must worry about
adverse selection.181 In this context, adverse selection represents the
possibility that those opting in are in fact those who would pay
lower taxes to the private provider than to the government. Private
intermediaries would use data and AI, plus careful design of the
alternative tax regime, to combat such adverse selection.
This Section explores the private intermediaries in more detail.
Part II.B.1 addresses which tasks the intermediary would take and
which tasks would remain the responsibility of the tax authority.
Part II.B.2 explores the organizational form of tax intermediaries,
noting that they might be for-profit or nonprofit cooperatives, and
Part II.B.3 examines the duration of the intermediary and of its
contract with the insured. Finally, Part II.B.4 explains different
strategies that the government might use to ensure that the in-
termediaries will in fact be able to pay their tax bills, as calculated
from the tax bills of the control group.
1. Division of Responsibility
Contractual tax reform can work with either the existing tax
authority (the IRS) or the private intermediary handling adminis-
tration.182 With IRS administration, the private intermediary might
design the alternative tax regime, but all taxpayers in the treatment
group would still file an annual tax return with the IRS. The return
would include a tax form identifying the intermediary and the
alternative tax regime. The IRS would continue to handle return
processing, auditing, and collection activities.183 Alternatively, the
180. See id.
181. See Michael Rothschild & Joseph Stiglitz, Equilibrium in Competitive Insurance
Markets: An Essay on the Economics of Imperfect Information, 90 Q.J. ECON. 629, 629 (1976)
(providing a theoretical model of adverse selection in insurance markets).
182. See generally MICHAEL I. SALTZMAN & LESLIE BOOK, IRS PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE
(2d ed. 2002) (providing full overview of tax enforcement, ranging from return-filing, to
auditing, to appeals, to collection of tax debts).
183. An issue arises as to whether the private intermediary’s liability should depend on the
total collected from the control and treatment groups (that is, tax bills actually collected) or
the total assessed against the control and treatment groups (that is, the tax bills reported).
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private intermediary might handle administration, replacing the
treatment-group taxpayers’ need to file tax returns with the IRS.
The taxpayers might file a return designed by the private intermedi-
ary, with the private intermediary, or potentially even no return at
all.184 In other words, alternative tax regimes could offer different
procedural law.
With private administration, substantive tax law might even be
unchanged. This highlights the fact that contractual tax reform
can be used to improve tax procedure as well as tax substance. IRS
tax administration currently suffers from two interrelated failures.
First, the IRS is large,185 cumbersome, and slow, failing to take full
advantage of new technology.186 Second, Congress has underfunded
the IRS,187 with each additional dollar spent on enforcement and
administration resulting in at least five dollars in additional rev-
enue collected.188 Private tax intermediaries would be able to raise
The distinction is that not all taxpayers pay their full assessed tax bill. See INTERNAL
REVENUE SERV., supra note 150, at 3 att.1 (noting the underpayment tax gap of $39 billion).
Basing the private intermediary’s liability solely on collections might give the IRS the per-
verse incentive not to try collecting from treatment taxpayers, since the intermediary serves
as a backstop. On the other hand, it may be easier to collect from such taxpayers, since
liability would not be in dispute. If the IRS cannot be trusted to be evenhanded, then liability
should be based on assessments. But very little of the “tax gap” is the result of the IRS’s
failure to collect. See id. (reporting the “Underpayment Tax Gap” as just $39 billion, which
is far less than the total “gross tax gap” of $458 billion). Indeed, the IRS is already quite good
at collecting assessed but unpaid taxes, plus penalties and interest. See id. (showing “Enforced
& Other Late Payments” as $52 billion).
184. See, e.g., MICHAEL J. GRAETZ, 100 MILLION UNNECESSARY RETURNS: A SIMPLE, FAIR,
AND COMPETITIVE TAX PLAN FOR THE UNITED STATES 191, 198 (2008) (proposing tax reforms
that would largely eliminate tax filing for many U.S. individuals).
185. See INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE DATA BOOK 2014 69 tbl.30
(2014) (listing 82,406 average full-time permanent employees during fiscal year 2014).
186. See Federal Agencies’ Reliance on Outdated and Unsupported Information Technology:
A Ticking Time Bomb: Hearing Before the H. Oversight and Gov’t Reform Comm., 114th Cong.
37-42 (2016) (written testimony of Terence Milholland, Chief Technology Officer of the IRS)
(discussing at length the IRS’s legacy technology systems, many of which were “initially
developed over 50 years ago,” and which were effectively designed to “automate[ ] the
processing of paper returns”).
187. See John Koskinen, Commissioner of Internal Revenue, Prepared Remarks Before the
AICPA, (Nov. 3, 2015), https://www.irs.gov/uac/prepared-remarks-of-commissioner-koskinen-
before-the-aicpa [https://perma.cc/CJN2-DSGL].
188. See U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE: FY 2017 PRESIDENT’S
BUDGET, at IRS-17 (2016), https://www.treasury.gov/about/budget-performance/CJ17/02-06.
%20IRS%20FY%202017%20CJ%201%2022%2016%20v2%20FINAL%20CLEAN.PDF [https://
perma.cc/2W8K-QHE7] (claiming that $5.60 per $1 spent is the average return on investment
2020] CONTRACTUAL TAX REFORM 1583
private capital to improve collections and to improve technology
systems outside the constraints of congressional budgeting that
hamper the IRS.189 Given a more efficient collection process that
induces greater compliance, intermediaries might be able to offer
participating taxpayers a small discount on their total liability.
Even if an alternative tax regime used the private intermediary
as administrator in lieu of the IRS, it would not free taxpayers from
possible criminal liability. Fraud against private intermediaries
would still be criminal tax fraud.190 Like insurers constantly seeking
to ferret out insurance fraud,191 private tax intermediaries would
have incentives to investigate such conduct and refer it to prose-
cutors.
2. Organizational Form
Some of the largest insurance companies in the United States
are mutual insurance companies, acting as cooperatives, owned by
their customers, and returning profits to them.192 Other insurers
are for-profit, with profits going to shareholders.193 One might ex-
pect to see both models appear for private tax intermediaries.
(ROI), and noting that some projects would be expected to achieve much higher ROIs, such
as $12.30 per $1 spent).
189. Many variations of alternative tax regimes with procedural changes are possible. For
example, the private intermediary might give taxpayers who agree to a more rigorous
collection process a slight discount on their returns in exchange.
190. See I.R.C. § 7201 (2012) (making “willfully attempt[ing] in any manner to evade or
defeat any tax imposed by this title or the payment thereof” a felony); BITTKER & LOKKEN,
supra note 38, ¶ 117.10.2 (discussing tax fraud and other tax crimes, of which § 7201 is the
“capstone” section (quoting Spies v. United States, 317 U.S. 492, 497 (1943))). Assuming that
the authority for contractual tax reform was provided in the Internal Revenue Code, which
is “this title” referred to in § 7201, then there need not even be any statutory amendment for
§ 7201 to apply to fraud against private tax intermediaries.
191. See 13A COUCH ON INSURANCE § 197:8 Westlaw (Steven Plitt et al. eds., 3d ed.
database updated June 2019) (noting incentives for insurers, as well as trend for insurers to
develop Special Investigative Units to attack insurance fraud); see also Model Insurance
Fraud Act, COAL. AGAINST INS. FRAUD, https://www.insurancefraud.org/model-fraud-act-
htm#9 [https://perma.cc/L9VU-MV6H] (allowing for cooperation and exchange of information
about insurance fraud between insurers and law enforcement).
192. Examples of mutual insurance companies include State Farm, New York Life, and
USAA. See Insurance Company, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019).
193. Id.
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For-profit tax intermediaries would attempt to attract taxpayers
to opt into their alternative tax regimes by designing them to be
utility enhancing for the taxpayers who opt in. To the extent that
treatment-group taxpayers pay higher taxes than control-group
taxpayers, the intermediary will earn gross profit. Subtracting out
the costs of designing and administering the regime, plus any
percentage that the government might demand to make the pro-
gram a revenue-raiser, would result in profits for shareholders.
Cooperative tax intermediaries would, by contrast, be akin to
mutual insurers. Mutual insurers offer insurance products general-
ly comparable to those offered by for-profit insurers, sweetened by
the possibility of a profit rebate.194 Cooperative tax intermediaries
would offer alternative tax regimes, sweetened with the possibility
of a tax rebate to treatment-group taxpayers.195 For example, if a
cooperative tax intermediary offered an alternative tax regime
where the treatment-group taxpayers generated 105 percent of the
tax revenue of the taxpayers in the control group, the cooperative
intermediary would refund treatment-group taxpayers 5 percent of
their taxes paid.196
Currently no private tax intermediaries exist—either for-profit or
cooperative. Where would these entities come from? Some for-profit
intermediaries would likely be similar to the current crop of “fin-
tech” (financial technology) firms that are reshaping finance—
including insurance—by taking advantage of artificial intelligence,
the lower transaction costs allowed by technology, and alternative
194. See id.
195. The formulas for the cooperative for dividing refunds amongst treatment-group
taxpayers would be one aspect of the alternative tax regime that the regime would need to
specify. One formula would be to rebate the cooperative’s surplus in proportion to the actual
tax revenue paid by the taxpayer. Another formula would be to rebate the surplus in
proportion to the amount by which the actual tax revenue paid by the taxpayer exceeded what
that taxpayer would have paid under the generally applicable tax code. Any number of other
formulas are possible to meet the goals of the cooperative. For example, the dairy cooperative
Land O’Lakes has six different rebate rates for different fertilizer types it sells to its
members. HENRY HANSMANN, THE OWNERSHIP OF ENTERPRISE 152 (1996); cf. Andrew Blair-
Stanek, Explaining the Enigmatic Expulsion in Northwest Wholesale Stationers v. Pacific
Stationery & Printing, 53 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 335, 378-80 (2017) (describing a historical
example of conflict within a cooperative caused by rebate formulas).
196. The precise number would, of course, be adjusted for the intermediaries’ costs of
administration, any share that the government demanded, and any rebates from the
government for savings in terms of IRS audit, dispute, and administration costs.
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funding methods.197 Companies such as H&R Block, Intuit (the
maker of TurboTax), and Jackson Hewitt Tax Service, Inc., which
already have a strong presence in tax preparation,198 might also
consider becoming private tax intermediaries. Indeed, these exist-
ing players have long strived to offer tax-related financial services
to their customers,199 so they might jump at the opportunity to be-
come private tax intermediaries.
Industry groups might set up cooperative tax intermediaries to
offer alternative tax regimes that address inefficiencies in the tax
code. For example, plumbers might find a particular substantiation
requirement of the tax code too costly in comparison to the addi-
tional tax revenues it raises for the government. The Plumbing
Contractors of America might offer its members an alternative tax
regime that removes this substantiation requirement, perhaps along
with a handful of other changes, in exchange for a slightly higher
tax rate. Politically active groups or nonprofits might set up co-
operative tax intermediaries to promote behavior seen as virtuous.
For example, environmentalist groups might offer an alternative tax
regime that taxed carbon in exchange for lower income-tax rates.200
We would not, however, allow employers to serve as intermediaries
for their own employees, because of the danger of conflicts of in-
terest.201
197. See, e.g., From the People, for the People, ECONOMIST: SPECIAL REPORT, May 9, 2015
at 3, 3-5.
198. See, e.g., Kim Komando, TurboTax, H&R Block, Jackson Hewitt: The Best Software
for Filing Online, USA TODAY (March 7, 2019, 8:25 AM), https://www.usatoday.com/story/tech/
columnist/komando/2019/03/07/turbotax-h-r-block-jackson-hewitt-best-software-file-taxes/
3055191002/ [https://perma.cc/Y4V3-SGMY] (discussing how “[m]ore people are filing taxes
online than ever” and comparing popular software).
199. For example, tax preparers offer various financial products giving customers access
to their refunds. See William Hoffman, Practitioners Hope for the Best as CADE 2 Imple-
mentation Begins, 134 TAX NOTES 302, 303 (2012) (discussing the decline of “refund an-
ticipation loans” offered by many tax preparers and the corresponding shift of the tax
preparation industry to “prepaid refund debit cards and other financial products”).
200. See Ian Ayres, Voluntary Taxation and Beyond: The Promise of Social-Contracting
Voting Mechanisms 20-26 (Yale Law Sch. John M. Olin Ctr. for Studies in Law, Econ. & Pub.
Policy, Research Paper No. 562, 2016), https://ssrn.com/abstract=2820299 [https://perma.cc/
5QG5-43SA] (using the concept of a specialized carbon tax to determine the probability of
participation by the general public in referenda facilitating social contracting).
201. One type of conflict is that an employer might seek to game the system by reducing
the earnings of employees randomly assigned to the control group, thus reducing the
employer’s own tax liability. This may be unlikely, but there is little benefit to tying tax
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3. Duration
The tax year might serve as a natural duration for an agreement
between a taxpayer and a private intermediary. Limiting duration
is especially important with initial experiments with contractual
reform, just as contractual tax reform should be limited in scope
initially to ensure that it is capable of producing benefits.202 In
principle, however, there could be benefits to longer duration. First,
intermediaries might wish to enable trade-offs over time. For ex-
ample, intermediaries might give greater tax discounts for edu-
cation or job training activities that they judge to be likely to be
successful in generating income in exchange for higher tax rates
once the training is complete. In this sense, contractual tax reform
can serve as a modest version of “income share agreements,” an
alternative to student loans in which students promise to repay a
portion of their future income.203
Second, long durations may be useful as a way of countering a
potential strategy in which taxpayers shift income into the contract
period and out of other periods.204 Regardless of the duration of the
contract, the government must ensure that the intermediaries’
profit or liability depends on all future tax payments by treatment-
and control-group taxpayers. Suppose, for example, that an in-
termediary offers an unusually attractive capital gains rate, leading
taxpayers to recognize capital gains during that period.205 That
might lead to higher tax payments in that year but lower tax
payments later. Thus, when the treatment group taxpayers pay less
in tax years following the initial contract, the intermediary would
be responsible for the difference. On the flip side, the intermediary
would be paid if their contract led to greater income recognized
later. These dangers will cause intermediaries to be careful in
contracts to the employment relationship.
202. See infra Part II.C.1.
203. See Shu-Yi Oei & Diane Ring, Human Equity? Regulating the New Income Share
Agreements, 68 VAND. L. REV. 681, 684 (2015) (offering a multifactorial framework for
regulating such agreements).
204. This danger also exists with governmental experimentation in taxation. See
Abramowicz, supra note 49, at 108-10.
205. In general, “any item of gross income shall be included in the gross income for the
taxable year in which received by the taxpayer.” I.R.C. § 451(a) (2012).
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designing their tax regimes in a way that prevents taxpayers from
exploiting timing rules to the disadvantage of the intermediaries;
for example, they might agree to limit capital gains recognition
(perhaps to zero) during the contract. Still, longer-term arrange-
ments might reduce this danger and thus be more attractive to both
taxpayers and private intermediaries.
4. Solvency Assurance
The potential for long-term liabilities for private intermediaries
strengthens the need to ensure that they will be sufficiently solvent
to meet them. Suppose Taxes, Inc. offered a disastrous alternative
tax regime that resulted in treatment-group taxpayers generating
tax revenues at a rate of only 80 percent of control-group taxpayers.
Taxes, Inc. would be required to reimburse some or all of the re-
maining 20 percent to the government. But Taxes, Inc. might have
insufficient assets to reimburse the government, resulting in in-
solvency. Avoiding this situation is crucial for contractual tax
reform to be viable, since, as the Supreme Court has repeatedly ob-
served, “taxes are the life-blood of government, and their prompt
and certain availability an imperious need.”206 If treatment-group
taxpayers produce more revenue than control-group taxpayers, the
intermediary’s shareholders or cooperative members keep some or
all of the extra. But if treatment-group taxpayers produce less rev-
enue, the intermediary might simply become insolvent, leaving the
government with less tax revenue than generally applicable tax law.
The result might be “heads the intermediary wins, tails the gov-
ernment loses.”207
Insurance and banking both provide similar risks of insolven-
cy. As a result, insurance regulation and banking regulation both
206. United States v. Nat’l Bank of Commerce, 472 U.S. 713, 733 (1985) (quoting Bull v.
United States, 295 U.S. 247, 259 (1935)).
207. Similar situations appear throughout the law. For example, equityholders in a
corporation with little equity will be tempted to take large risks, since they reap the upsides
while the corporation’s creditors bear the downsides. See Credit Lyonnais Bank Nederland,
N.V. v. Pathe Comm’n Corp., Civ. A. No. 12150, 1991 WL 277613, at *34 n.55 (Del. Ch. Dec.
30, 1981). Similarly, before their insolvency, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac were private for-
profit corporations operating with a de facto government guarantee, leading them to take
large risks. See Carol J. Perry, Note, Rethinking Fannie and Freddie’s New Insolvency Regime,
109 COLUM. L. REV. 1752, 1772 (2009).
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provide several possible solutions that could work for regulating
private tax intermediaries. These solutions include capital require-
ments, bonding, and caveat emptor.
Capital requirements ensure the solvency of FDIC-insured
banks208 and of insurers.209 Banks are required to have sufficient
capital—consisting of equity and debt that is subordinated to bank
depositors—to ensure sufficient assets are available to repay de-
positors in full.210 This “capital cushion” generally needs to be larger
when the bank is taking greater risks, and smaller when the bank
is taking smaller risks.211 Similarly, private tax intermediaries could
be required to have sufficient capital—consisting of equity and debt
subordinated to tax revenue owed to the government—to ensure
sufficient assets to pay the government. The greater the riskiness
of the alternative tax regime, the more capital the intermediary
would have to hold on its balance sheet.
Bonding is the second model for addressing the risk of interme-
diary insolvency. When governments enter into contracts with pri-
vate companies to build public buildings or public works, statutes
require that the private companies furnish bonds to ensure that the
building is built and that all suppliers, workers, and subcontractors
are paid.212 A third party acts as a surety on such bonds,213 ensuring
performance and full payment if the contractor becomes insolvent.214
208. See MICHAEL P. MALLOY, BANKING LAW & REGULATION § 7.03(c)(4) (2d ed. Supp. IV
2019); see also Mehrsa Baradaran, Regulation by Hypothetical, 67 VAND. L. REV. 1247, 1265-
72 (2014) (overview of existing regime of bank capital requirements).
209. See 1 COUCH ON INSURANCE, supra note 191, § 2:27 (discussing capital-reserve reg-
ulation of insurers); 3 id. § 39:4 (“Typically, the commissioner of insurance may require that
a certain portion of the capital remain unimpaired in order to safely satisfy potential claims.”).
210. See MALLOY, supra note 208, § 7.03(C)(4)(b).
211. See id.
212. See, e.g., 40 U.S.C § 3131(b)(1)-(2) (2012). See generally 17 AM. JUR. 2d Contractors’
Bonds § 25 (2019).
213. See, e.g., United States ex rel. Sherman v. Carter, 353 U.S. 210, 213 (1957) (involving
Hartford Accident and Indemnity Company as surety); Alice Zelikson, What Is a Construction
Surety Bond?, GEN RE (Mar. 19, 2015), http://www.genre.com/knowledge/blog/what-is-a-con
struction-surety-bond.html [https://perma.cc/UYC2-ETUE] (“[A] surety company is typically
part of an insurance company.”).
214. See 74 AM. JUR. 2D, supra note 212, § 1 (“A suretyship is a three-party relationship
where the surety [for example, the insurance company] undertakes to perform to an obligee
[for example, the government] if the principal [for example, the private contractor] fails to do
so. The surety stands in the shoes of the principal and must complete any obligation due the
obligee at the time of default.” (footnotes omitted)).
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Because the surety will be on the hook if the contractor defaults, the
surety has a strong incentive to scrutinize the risk that the con-
tractor will fail to complete the project, and thus to charge an ap-
propriate premium. Similarly, insurance regulators often allow
insurance companies to post a bond to guard against the insurer
becoming insolvent and unable to satisfy policyholders’ claims.215
Private tax intermediaries could be required to furnish bonds to
ensure that the government is paid.
Caveat emptor is the third model for addressing the risk of
intermediary insolvency. Banking regulation uses this approach
for wealthy depositors; FDIC insurance covers only the first
$250,000 in deposits.216 Any deposits above $250,000 can be fully or
partially lost if the bank becomes insolvent.217 Insurance regulation
sometimes also uses this approach, as policyholders may receive
less than the full amount owed them by an insurer that becomes in-
solvent.218 Applying this caveat emptor model to private tax inter-
mediaries, if an intermediary becomes insolvent, then all taxpayers
in the treatment group would be required to pay their ordinary tax
obligation to the government under the generally applicable tax
laws. This approach creates incentives for taxpayers to evaluate and
monitor the financial condition of their tax intermediary. Mean-
while, a tax intermediary could reduce the risk of insolvency by
providing in the alternative tax regime’s definition that if tax re-
ceipts fall short, all treatment group taxpayers must pay an ad-
ditional amount sufficient to cover the amount the intermediary
owes to the government. Regardless of how it is implemented, ca-
veat emptor would give participating taxpayers incentives to assess
the feasibility of an alternative tax regime before opting into it.
215. 1 COUCH ON INSURANCE, supra note 191, § 2:28.
216. FED. DEPOSIT INS. CORP., YOUR INSURED DEPOSITS 2 (2014), https://www.fdic.gov/
deposit/deposits/brochures/your-insured-deposits-english.pdf [https://perma.cc/BE8T-2L5E].
217. See id.
218. 1 COUCH ON INSURANCE, supra note 191, § 6:8 (discussing priority of claims upon
insurer insolvency, with policyholders often towards the end of the line, depending on state
law).
1590 WILLIAM & MARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 61:1537
C. Regulation of Contractual Tax Reform
Once assured that the private intermediary is solvent, the gov-
ernment need not micromanage the contract between the interme-
diary and the insured. Nonetheless, some regulation of contracts
may be warranted, especially with early experiments with contrac-
tual tax reform. Part II.C.1 describes limitations that may be
appropriate. Part II.C.2 addresses how regulations should address
changes in filing status, such as marriage. Finally, Part II.C.3
explores how the government might encourage innovation among
private intermediaries.
1. Limitations
In principle, an alternative tax regime offered by a private tax
intermediary might involve any changes whatsoever to tax law—
procedural, substantive, or a combination of both. But the gov-
ernment would likely prohibit some changes. For example, to the
extent that an alternative tax regime changed procedural law, the
government would require adhering to standards of due process,
like those already present in the tax code.219 As another example,
some existing substantive tax benefits, like the tax credit for re-
search and development, aim to encourage positive externalities
or discourage negative externalities.220 The government might sim-
ply bar alternative tax regimes that remove such tax benefits, so
that contractual tax reform does not reduce social welfare.
The government would likely require intermediaries to file the
alternative tax regime and the eligibility criteria with the govern-
ment before offering it to taxpayers. A key design question is
whether the government must approve this alternative regime
and eligibility criteria before invitations can go out, or whether fil-
ing alone suffices to allow invitations. There is precedent for both
approaches. In securities law, filing is normally all that is required
for many actions.221 But in insurance law, regulators must approve
219. See, e.g., I.R.C. §§ 6320, 6330 (2012).
220. See supra notes 25-31 and accompanying text.
221. See 15 U.S.C. § 77f(c) (2012) (“The filing with the Commission of a registration
statement, or of an amendment to a registration statement, shall be deemed to have taken
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insurers’ proposed policies,222 and at least in initial implementation,
that approach is likely preferable.
2. Filing Status
Calculating the amount that a private intermediary owes becomes
more challenging when taxpayers may change their filing status.223
In particular, an individual taxpayer might change his or her tax
filing status by marrying or divorcing, and a business association
might merge with another business association224 or spin off a
subsidiary.225 Taxpayers might do so opportunistically, or for rea-
sons having nothing to do with the experiment.
These problems are easily addressed. Any individual or entity
outside the treatment group for the relevant time period (whether
in the control group or outside the experiment altogether) will con-
tinue to be subject to independent tax liability if it combines
through marriage or merger with a taxpayer in the treatment group.
For example, if a treatment-group individual taxpayer has agreed
to pay a lump sum of $100,000 in taxes,226 someone who marries
that person cannot suddenly claim that the couple must pay a total
of just $100,000. Similarly, if a treatment-group company merged
with a non-treatment-group company, the latter would have to file
separate corporate tax returns.227 Existing tax law may already
place upon the receipt thereof.”); 1 THOMAS LEE HAZEN, TREATISE ON THE LAW OF SECURITIES
REGULATION § 1:17, Westlaw (database updated May 2019) (noting that the Securities Act of
1933 focuses primarily on filing and disclosure, rather than review of merit).
222. 1 COUCH ON INSURANCE, supra note 191, § 2:8 (noting that state insurance “commis-
sioners are called upon to approve policy forms to assure that they are in conformity with all
applicable statutes”).
223. This problem can be seen as analogous to the problem of “crossover” in the ad-
ministration of randomized experiments. See, e.g., Michael Abramowicz et al., Randomizing
Law, 159 U. PA. L. REV. 929, 959-60 (2011). For example, if a taxpayer originally in the control
group marries a taxpayer in the treatment group, then subjecting the taxpayer to the
treatment regime would amount to changing the taxpayer’s group membership.
224. See I.R.C. § 368(a) (2012) (defining how mergers can be tax free).
225. See id. § 355 (governing tax treatment of corporate separations, such as spin-offs,
split-offs, and split-ups).
226. See supra Part I.B.1 (giving example of alternative regime with lump-sum payment
in exchange for low or zero marginal rates).
227. In many reorganizations, companies maintain their filing statuses in any event. See,
e.g., I.R.C. § 368(a)(1)(B) (providing rules for “B” reorganizations).
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require separate corporate tax returns to avoid abuse,228 so this
requirement would be easily implemented.
Changes in control-group taxpayers’ status will matter only
insofar as they modestly complicate the government’s calculation of
the private intermediary’s liability. Such taxpayers have no in-
centive to game the system, since they pay taxes according to the
usual rules. So long as the government can develop a reasonable
model allocating tax payment among these taxpayers, this should
not be an issue. For example, such a model would allocate income
paid by a newly married couple between the members of the couple,
so if one had been a control-group member and the other was not,
the total control group tax payments can be approximated.229 A
divorcing couple poses less of a challenge; just add together their
subsequent tax payments.
Treatment-group taxpayers, in contrast, do have an incentive to
game the system, but this is not the government’s problem. The pri-
vate intermediary would need to address this in the alternative tax
regime. Such solutions could be straightforward. For example, for
a married couple, the alternative tax regime might simply treat
each spouse as a separate taxpayer. This illustrates how contractual
tax reform can accomplish a tax reform goal (eliminating the United
States’s unusual joint-married filing status230) without specific leg-
islation on point.
This example also illustrates another advantage of contractual
tax reform over government-run experimentation.231 If the govern-
ment ran experimentation, it would need to worry about exploita-
tion of loopholes by treatment-group taxpayers. The possibility for
loopholes certainly does not vanish with contractual tax reform, but
intermediaries may be able to respond much more quickly than the
228. See 4 BITTKER & LOKKEN, supra note 38, ¶ 97.2 (discussing corporations filing
consolidated tax returns in certain circumstances).
229. For example, the W-2 wages and salary for each spouse are reported separately with
each spouse’s Social Security number, and the Schedule C “Profit or Loss from Business” also
reports the separate proprietors.
230. See, e.g., Edward Fox, Do Taxes Affect Marriage? Lessons from History 9-10 (Law &
Econ. Research Paper Series, Working Paper No. 17-15, 2017), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstract_id=2988559 [https://perma.cc/PKD9-8SPR] (comparing the U.S. regime
to the rest of the world).
231. For a discussion of status changes with government-run tax experiments, see
Abramowicz, supra note 49, at 110-13.
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government to problems. If treatment-group taxpayers exploit the
alternative regime in some unanticipated way, then the private
intermediary can update its alternative tax regime in the future.
That process would likely be easier and quicker than changing
statutes or regulations. And, unlike Congress and the IRS, private
tax intermediaries would have strong financial incentives to seek
out and close loopholes.
3. Innovation Incentives
A potential private tax intermediary faces two risks: that too few
taxpayer-customers will opt in; and that taxpayers who opt in and
receive the alternative tax regime will pay less per capita than the
control group (thus requiring reimbursing the government for some
or all of the shortfall). The government should encourage potential
private intermediaries to brave such risks, to foster innovation and
experimentation in tax law.
A private intermediary might capture the benefits from its
innovations in several ways. The first intermediary to offer an
alternative regime attractive to many customers would have a first-
mover advantage. An intermediary might earn a good reputation for
making taxpayer-customers happy, such as by increasing their
utility, or with good customer service. Moreover, an intermediary’s
eligibility criteria for each alternative tax regime should remain
confidential,232 and thus would be trade secrets, protected from
misappropriation.233
But intermediaries may be discouraged from developing innova-
tive alternative tax regimes and eligibility criteria by the threat of
copycat intermediaries adopting the same regimes. Even though
eligibility criteria for an alternative tax regime might be confiden-
tial and protected as trade secrets, competitors would likely at least
observe which alternative tax regimes proved successful, based on
232. The eligibility criteria would be filed with the government but not publicly disclosed.
Keeping the eligibility criteria confidential also has the benefit of preventing opportunistic
taxpayers from planning their affairs to qualify for an alternative tax regime that would give
them a windfall.
233. See UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT WITH 1985 AMENDMENTS §§ 1(4), 2 (NAT'L CONFERENCE
OF COMM'RS ON UNIF. STATE LAWS).
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the first-mover’s decision to continue offering them.234 From an ex
post perspective, copying alternative tax regimes is desirable,
because more competition will drive down profit and increase the
benefits from alternative tax regimes to taxpayers (and potentially
also to the government in the form of greater tax collections). But
from an ex ante perspective, intermediaries may not be willing to
undertake a risky new alternative tax regime without the oppor-
tunity to capture a significant portion of the social gains if suc-
cessful.235
The intellectual property literature already provides guidance on
mitigating the risk that copying business methods will lead to too
little innovation.236 The government might address this problem by
providing a time-limited exclusive right to an intermediary that is
willing to commercialize an alternative tax regime strategy that no
one else is willing to commercialize absent the exclusive right.237
Such a mechanism, however, would be unnecessary if intermediar-
ies produced extensive innovation without it.
III. POTENTIAL OBJECTIONS
We have already considered objections to contractual tax reform
internal to the mechanism, such as whether the system might be
gamed by short-term contracts,238 insolvent intermediaries,239 or fil-
ing status changes.240 We now turn to broader objections: that con-
tractual tax reform might exploit participating taxpayers or that it
might have systemic negative effects on equity.
234. See Michael Abramowicz & John F. Duffy, Intellectual Property for Market Ex-
perimentation, 83 N.Y.U. L. REV. 337, 340 (2008) (cited by Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593, 651
n.51 (2010) (Stevens, J., dissenting)).
235. See id.
236. See Michael Abramowicz, Orphan Business Models: Toward a New Form of Intellectual
Property, 124 HARV. L. REV. 1362, 1363-70 (2011); Abramowicz & Duffy, supra note 234, at
338-45.
237. See Orphan Drug Act of 1983, Pub. L. No. 97-414, 96 Stat. 2049 (1983) (codified at 21
U.S.C. §§ 360aa-360ee (2012)) (providing limited exclusivity to drugmakers willing to take the
risks and cost of getting FDA approval for “orphan” drugs); Abramowicz, supra note 236, at
1396-99 (proposing a similar mechanism).
238. See supra Part II.B.3.
239. See supra Part II.B.4.
240. See supra Part II.C.2.
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A. Taxpayer Exploitation
Historical evidence shows that reward structures for tax col-
lectors can create corruption and abuses.241 “Tax farming” helped
precipitate the French Revolution,242 and Roman tax collection
practices243 made tax collectors the quintessential sinners in the
Christian gospels.244 In the Roman Empire and pre-Revolution
France, the government sold the right to collect taxes to tax col-
lectors, who then had a profit incentive to squeeze as much money
as possible from those under their jurisdiction.245 Such arrange-
ments do bear passing resemblance to contractual tax reform, but
241. See CHARLES ADAMS, FOR GOOD AND EVIL: THE IMPACT OF TAXES ON THE COURSE OF
CIVILIZATION xvii-xix, 43-48, 66, 81-102, 222-35 (1993) (collecting evidence from ancient Egypt,
ancient Israel, ancient Greece, ancient Rome, the rise of Islam, the Middle Ages in Europe,
Cortes’s conquest of the Aztecs, pre-Revolution France, Tudor and Stuart England, the
revolutionary United States, as well as the modern world). Looking beyond just tax law, there
is a voluminous literature on both the benefits and downsides of allowing private inter-
mediaries to take on any function previously performed by the government. See, e.g., JOHN
VICKERS & GEORGE YARROW, PRIVATIZATION: AN ECONOMIC ANALYSIS 1-9, 45-47 (1988); Peter
F. Drucker, The Sickness of Government, 14 PUB. INTEREST 3, 3-6, 17-23 (1969); Jody
Freeman, Extending Public Law Norms Through Privatization, 116 HARV. L. REV. 1285, 1291-
1314 (2003) (providing a thorough summary of pro- and antiprivatization arguments); Jon
D. Michaels, Privatization’s Pretensions, 77 U. CHI. L. REV. 717, 717-24 (2010); Chris Sagers,
The Myth of “Privatization,” 59 ADMIN. L. REV. 37, 43 nn.14-38 (2007) (collecting citations
to privatization literature); Matthew Titolo, Privatization and the Market Frame, 60 BUFF.
L. REV. 493, 494 (2012).
242. ADAMS, supra note 241, at 223-35.
243. Id. at 81-102 (discussing tax collection in the Roman Republic and then early Roman
Empire); see also id. at 43-48 (discussing Roman tax collection, or attempts thereof, in ancient
Israel).
244. In the Gospel of Luke, Jesus stayed with a tax collector named Zaccheus. Luke 19:1-10
(English Standard). This caused the crowd to “grumble[ ], [saying,] ‘He [Jesus] has gone in to
be the guest of a man who is a sinner.’” Id. 19:7. This kindness caused Zaccheus to repent,
give half his possessions to the poor, and promise quadruple restitution to those he had
defrauded, whereupon Jesus announced, “Today salvation has come to this house.” Id. 19:89.
In a separate chapter, Jesus tells a parable that includes a tax collector who “beat his breast,
saying, ‘God, be merciful to me, a sinner!’” Luke 18:9-14 (English Standard). In the Gospel of
Mark, critics of Jesus ask His disciples, “Why does he eat with tax collectors and sinners?”
Mark 2:16 (English Standard). Jesus responds, “I came not to call the righteous, but sinners.”
Id. 2:17.
245. See ADAMS, supra note 241, at 81-82 (discussing the publicani of the Roman Republic);
id. at 95 (noting that even after Augustus moved away from the publicani, local governments
would often use tax farmers to collect taxes on behalf of Rome); id. at 222-23 (discussing the
pre-revolutionary French tax farming system).
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only in that an intermediary stands between the taxpayer and
government.
Contractual tax reform differs from tax farming in crucial ways.
First, tax farming aimed to maximize revenues for the government
and for tax farmers,246 but contractual tax reform seeks primarily to
increase taxpayer utility. Second, participation is optional. By con-
trast, pre-revolutionary French taxpayers could not opt out of tax
farming, although they sometimes tried to opt out by killing tax
farmers.247 Third, contractual tax reform would be governed by
written alternative tax regimes, regulated by the government to
protect taxpayers, and subject to judicial process. Tax farming did
work relatively well in democratic ancient Athens, where courts
fairly adjudicated any disputes involving abuses by tax farmers.248
The unpopularity of the IRS suggests that private tax collection
could be an improvement,249 but regulation must ensure that con-
tractual tax reform does not exploit taxpayers. We consider three
different concerns: first, that private intermediaries might, like tax
farmers of old, take advantage of unsophisticated taxpayers; second,
that contractual tax reform might adversely affect taxpayer privacy;
and third, that taxpayers might be coerced into making concessions
to private intermediaries, perhaps even unconstitutionally.
1. Deceptive Practices
Taxpayers may have relatively little information about private
tax intermediaries, and the alternative tax regimes might be
complicated. (However, the alternative tax regimes would often
be far simpler than the existing voluminous tax code.250 ) Some 
246. See id. at 66.
247. See id. at 227-35 (discussing the gruesome ends met by many French tax farmers).
248. See id. at 66-67.
249. PEW RESEARCH CTR., MOST VIEW THE CDC FAVORABLY; VA’S IMAGE SLIPS: RATINGS OF
GOVERNMENT AGENCIES 1 (2015), https://www.people-press.org/wp-content/uploads/sites/4/
2015/01/1-22-15-Favorability-release.pdf [https://perma.cc/78NP-MYQC] (showing that IRS
is only federal agency with more respondents having an unfavorable opinion of it than a fav-
orable opinion).
250. See Dylan Matthews, The Myth of the 70,000-Page Federal Tax Code, VOX (Mar. 29,
2017, 2:10 PM), https://www.vox.com/policy-and-politics/2017/3/29/15109214/tax-code-page-
count-complexity-simplification-reform-ways-means [https://perma.cc/GJJ9-9GUF] (discussing
how the tax code is around 2600 pages if one does not count IRS regulations, revenue rulings,
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intermediaries may seek to exploit any lack of information or be-
havioral biases exhibited by taxpayers. For example, intermediar-
ies may exploit hyperbolic discounting251 by inducing taxpayers to
enter into alternative tax regimes that provide them lower taxes in
one year but much higher taxes in later years.252 This has the effect
of a usurious loan, but it could be more pernicious if the complexity
of an alternative tax regime made it hard to recognize it as such.
There is a substantial debate in the literature about the extent to
which the government needs to protect consumers from them-
selves.253
Assuming taxpayers do need protection, a familiar approach is
for the government to police disclosure rigorously. In the wake of
the 2007-09 financial crisis and related mortgage abuses, Congress
and the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB) set out to
simplify disclosures to mortgage applicants.254 The invitation to
opt into an alternative tax regime could similarly require easy-to-
read disclosures,255 including key comparisons, such as how much
tax would be due under the generally applicable law versus the
and case law, which all together amounts to around 70,000 pages).
251. See GEORGE W. AINSLIE, PICOECONOMICS 80, 109, 125, 228, 371 (1992); Richard Thaler,
Some Empirical Evidence on Dynamic Inconsistency, 8 ECON. LETTERS 201, 205-07 (1981).
252. See Oren Bar-Gill, The Behavioral Economics of Consumer Contracts, 92 MINN. L. REV.
749, 761-65, 769-76 (2008); Stephan Meier & Charles Sprenger, Impatience and Credit
Behavior: Evidence from a Field Experiment 25 (Fed. Reserve Bank of Bos., Working Paper
No. 07-3, 2007), http://www.bos.frb.org/economic/wp/wp2007/wp0703.pdf [https://perma.cc/
NS98-KYV7] (showing consumers engaged in hyperbolic discounting); supra note 237 and
accompanying text.
253. See Elizabeth Warren, Unsafe at Any Rate, DEMOCRACY J. (2007), https://democracy
journal.org/magazine/5/unsafe-at-any-rate/ [https://perma.cc/DZQ7-HDWL] (arguing for pro-
tecting consumers in financial transactions); see also Michael S. Barr et al., The Case for
Behaviorally Informed Regulation, in NEW PERSPECTIVES ON REGULATION 25, 41-42 (2009).
The private sector’s profit motive may provide incentive for abuse, much as some critics argue
that banks exploit borrowers unable to afford loans. See, e.g., Thomas B. Edsall, Making
Money Off the Poor, N.Y. TIMES: OPINIONATOR (Sept. 17, 2013, 10:48 PM), https://opiniona
tor.blogs.nytimes.com/2013/09/17/making-money-off-the-poor [https://perma.cc/A5PP-86VR];
Jessica Silver-Greenberg & Michael Corkery, Rise in Loans Linked to Cars Is Hurting Poor,
N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 25, 2014, 12:13 PM), https://dealbook.nytimes.com/2014/12/25/dipping-into-
auto-equity-devastates-many-borrowers/ [https://perma.cc/8BW5-TSWQ].
254. See Integrated Mortgage Disclosures Under the Real Estate Settlement Procedures
Act (Regulation X) and the Truth in Lending Act (Regulation Z), 78 Fed. Reg. 79730 (Dec. 31,
2013) (codified at 12 C.F.R. pts. 1024, 1026).
255. See Kali Jensen, The Plain English Movement’s Shifting Goals, 13 J. GENDER, RACE
& JUST. 807, 808-17 (2010) (recounting the history of the Plain English movement).
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alternative regime, for several scenarios likely for the taxpayer. The
government could also publish extensive data on the past perfor-
mance on each intermediary (and indeed on every alternative tax
regime) showing how taxpayers who opted in fared compared to
control group taxpayers, plus surveys of treatment-group taxpayers’
satisfaction. Whether or not the government enables contractual
reform, it will need to regulate similar arrangements, such as the
use of AI in offering alternative regimes for student loans.256
The government also might protect consumers with regulatory
strategies specific to contractual tax reform. The government might
prohibit particular provisions in agreements or it might limit how
far alternative tax regimes deviate from generally applicable tax
law (for example, requiring tax rates to remain within 3 percent of
existing rates).257 Similarly, the government might protect taxpayers
by giving them an option to cap the amount they must pay under
the alternative tax regime. For example, the government might
specify that, in any year, a treatment-group taxpayer may opt out
of the alternative tax regime and pay only 110 percent of what the
taxpayer would have owed under the generally applicable tax laws.
Such a cap would limit intermediaries’ opportunistic behavior.258 In
early stages of contractual tax reform, the government could begin
with a relatively low cap, but increase that percentage over time if
taxpayer exploitation does not become a problem.
2. Privacy Violations
Much of the population believes that the private sector already
maintains too much data about individuals.259 Contractual tax
256. See supra note 203 and accompanying text.
257. See supra Section II.C.1. An alternative, heavier-handed approach would be for the
government to specify those terms that the alternative tax regime might offer (such as,
permissible tax rates and a list of tax benefits that might be removed). Of course, such a
heavy-handed approach might stifle valuable innovation.
258. Private tax intermediaries could protect themselves by providing that liability to them
shall be no less than some percentage (say, 95 percent) of what the federal tax bill would have
been, so that the requirement is not asymmetric.
259. See Chris Jay Hoofnagle & Jennifer M. Urban, Alan Westin’s Privacy Homo
Economicus, 49 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 261, 278 (2014) (reporting survey data showing
overwhelming majority of respondents worry about private companies’ collection and use of
personal information); Frank Pasquale, The Dark Market for Personal Data, N.Y. TIMES (Oct.
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reform can incentivize taxpayers to reveal private information, such
as their earnings potential.260 This private information, in turn, can
be used to improve taxpayers’ utility while either maintaining or
increasing government revenues. But putting additional personal
information into private hands creates the potential for abuse.261
The debates around the privacy of personal data are well beyond
the scope of this Article.262 But much concern about privacy could be
addressed by simply binding private tax intermediaries to the same
tax information confidentiality provisions that already severely
restrict the IRS’s ability to disclose taxpayer information.263
3. Unconstitutional Conditions
Arguably, the government should not coerce people into giving up
their rights, even by paying them to do so. The Supreme Court has
developed a “doctrine of unconstitutional conditions,” asking when
a condition on receipt of a government benefit is unconstitutionally
16, 2014), https://www.nytimes.com/2014/10/17/opinion/the-dark-market-for-personal-data.
html [https://perma.cc/9RSS-TVWL].
260. See supra Part I.B.1 (encouraging taxpayers to reveal information about their earn-
ings potential through their decision to opt in or not); supra Section I.B.2 (encouraging
taxpayers to reveal information about their work versus leisure preferences through opting
in or not).
261. A related concern is that, once a taxpayer reveals private information about ability
to an intermediary, the government might act opportunistically, using that information to
maximize revenues to the taxpayer’s detriment. See BOADWAY, supra note 7, at 195-96 (dis-
cussing the problem of government commitment not to misuse information about taxpayers).
For example, if moderate earners with high earnings potential but high preferences for leisure
reveal these characteristics by opting into an alternative regime, the government in the future
could opportunistically raise the inframarginal rates on such taxpayers—thus pushing them
to work harder to maintain the same utility. See id.; see also Dagobert L. Brito et al., Dynamic
Optimal Income Taxation with Government Commitment, 44 J. PUB. ECON. 15, 15-18, 27-28
(1991).
262. See, e.g., HELEN NISSENBAUM, PRIVACY IN CONTEXT: TECHNOLOGY, POLICY, AND THE
INTEGRITY OF SOCIAL LIFE 1-17 (2010); Danielle Keats Citron, Mainstreaming Privacy Torts,
98 CALIF. L. REV. 1805, 1808-11 (2010); Julie E. Cohen, Examined Lives: Informational
Privacy and the Subject as Object, 52 STAN. L. REV. 1373, 1416-18, 1421 (2000); Jonathan D.
Frieden et al., Putting the Genie Back in the Bottle: Leveraging Private Enforcement to
Improve Internet Privacy, 37 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1671, 1722-25 (2011); Lauren Gelman,
Privacy, Free Speech, and “Blurry Edged” Social Networks, 50 B.C. L. REV. 1315, 1342 (2009);
Daniel J. Solove & Woodrow Hartzog, The FTC and the New Common Law of Privacy, 114
COLUM. L. REV. 583, 667-76 (2014); authorities cited supra note 265.
263. See I.R.C. § 6103 (2012).
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coercive.264 Consider the example alternative tax regime where
shopkeepers receive a tax-rate discount in exchange for consenting
to intensive electronic reporting.265 The taxpayers’ cash register and
credit card machines would report all activity electronically to the
intermediary, potentially backstopped by a camera to prevent cash
payments “under the counter.”266 The tax-rate discount is a govern-
ment benefit, albeit one administered through a private intermedi-
ary, and the intensive monitoring is a condition on receipt of that
benefit.
If mandating intensive electronic reporting would be unconstitu-
tional,267 perhaps conditioning receipt of a tax benefit on such
reporting might be unconstitutional too, though the use of private
intermediaries makes this less likely. A two-part test governs.268
First, there must be an “essential nexus” between a “legitimate
state interest” and the condition.269 Preventing tax avoidance is a
quintessential legitimate state interest,270 and monitoring busi-
nesses for unreported income has a clear nexus with preventing
tax avoidance.271 Second, there must be a “rough proportionality”
264. See Kathleen M. Sullivan, Unconstitutional Conditions, 102 HARV. L. REV. 1413, 1416
(1989) (attempting to clarify the doctrine, which is “riven with inconsistencies”); Cass R.
Sunstein, Why the Unconstitutional Conditions Doctrine Is an Anachronism (with Particular
Reference to Religion, Speech, and Abortion), 70 B.U. L. REV. 593, 620 (1990) (calling the
doctrine “too crude and too general to provide help in dealing with contested cases”); see also
Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 407 n.12 (1994) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“Although it
has a long history, ... the ‘unconstitutional conditions’ doctrine has for just as long suffered
from notoriously inconsistent application.” (citation omitted)).
265. See supra Part I.C.2.
266. See supra Part I.C.2.
267. The Fourth Amendment generally requires either warrants or an opportunity for
precompliance review before searching commercial records. U.S. CONST. amend. IV; see, e.g.,
City of Los Angeles v. Patel, 135 S. Ct. 2443, 2452 (2015). There is an exception only for
closely regulated industries such as liquor sales, firearms dealing, mining, and automobile
junkyards. Id. at 2454.
268. Dolan, 512 U.S. at 386; 1 RODNEY A. SMOLLA, SMOLLA & NIMMER ON FREEDOM OF
SPEECH § 7:14 (2019) (using the holding of Dolan to elucidate the doctrine of unconstitutional
conditions).
269. Dolan, 512 U.S. at 386; see also SMOLLA, supra note 268, § 7:14.
270. Colangelo v. United States, 575 F.2d 994, 998 (1st Cir. 1978) (Coffin, C.J., dissenting)
(acknowledging the majority’s finding “orderly assessment and collection of taxes” to be a
legitimate government interest); see also New York ex rel. Cohn v. Graves, 300 U.S. 308, 313
(1937) (“Taxes are what we pay for civilized society.”).
271. See supra notes 150-58 and accompanying text (discussing the “tax gap,” hundreds of
billions of dollars primarily resulting from unreported business income).
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between the condition and the benefit.272 If all eligible taxpayers
opted in, that might indicate a lack of proportionality, suggesting
that shopkeepers believe they need to participate to remain com-
petitive. But so long as a substantial proportion of taxpayers decline
to opt in, rough proportionality should be presumed. A similar
analysis would likely uphold any alternative tax regime offered as
opt in.
B. Equality and Equity
1. Worsening Inequality
Unless carefully designed, contractual tax reform might worsen
inequality. Higher-income taxpayers tend to have better tax ad-
visors, are less risk-averse, and provide proportionally higher
potential tax increases to cover the costs of designing and admin-
istering an alternative tax regime.273 Intermediaries might focus
their efforts on providing Pareto-efficient alternative tax regimes
only for the well off. At its worst, contractual tax reform would be
like the bank system, which often leaves lower-income individuals
without banking services (“unbanked”) or with only limited access
to banking services (“underbanked”).274
Yet contractual tax reform can be designed to maximize the
utility of the less fortunate through progressive formulas regarding
the allocation of profit (that is, the excess of taxes paid by treat-
ment-group taxpayers over control-group taxpayers). For example,
when intermediaries offer alternative regimes to taxpayers mak-
ing over $200,000 per year, the government might allow the in-
termediary to keep just 30 percent of all additional tax revenue
generated by the treatment group, in comparison to the control
group. By contrast, when intermediaries offer alternative regimes
to taxpayers making under $40,000 per year, the government might
allow the intermediary to keep 100 percent of the additional tax
272. Dolan, 512 U.S. at 391; see also SMOLLA, supra note 268, § 7:14.
273. See Abramowicz, supra note 49, at 104.
274. See FED. DEPOSIT INS. CORP., FDIC NATIONAL SURVEY OF UNBANKED AND UNDER-
BANKED HOUSEHOLDS 2015, at 1-2 (2016), https://www.fdic.gov/householdsurvey/2015/2015
report.pdf [https://perma.cc/52AV-ZV79].
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revenue generated. Such progressive formulas would incentivize
creating alternative tax regimes that increase lower-income tax-
payers’ utility.275
2. Violating Horizontal Equity
Horizontal equity is the principle that taxpayers earning the
same income should pay the same amount of tax.276 Contractual tax
reform presents two potential violations of horizontal equity. First,
the intermediary would not offer the alternative tax regime to all
taxpayers. Second, of those taxpayers invited to opt in and who do
opt in, the government will randomly assign some percentage to the
control group, who would be subject instead to the normal tax code.
The first objection—that not all taxpayers are invited to opt into
every alternative regime—is largely overcome by the fact that it is
the private intermediary, not the government, deciding who is
invited. Suppose that two individuals, A and B, both interview for
a coveted private-sector job that pays $10,000 more after taxes than
their current job. It is unobjectionable that only one of the two will
get the job. This situation differs little from a private tax intermedi-
ary offering an alternative tax regime, which will increase after-tax
income by $10,000, to only one of A or B. Indeed, the government
itself already uses invitations in tax administration. For example,
the IRS has offered an invitation-only “compliance assurance pro-
cess” (CAP) that allowed for ex ante (that is, before return filing)
275. This aspect of contractual tax reform is even more powerful if one considers “taxes”
more broadly to include not only monies raised from individuals, but also transfer payments
(such as antipoverty programs) made to individuals as negative taxes. This broader view of
“taxes” is common in the economic literature. See, e.g., BOADWAY, supra note 7, at 152-74;
Akerlof, supra note 114, at 8. Contractual tax reform for lower-income individuals could thus
be seen as a way to encourage privately run alternative regimes that help individuals escape
poverty, such as by eliminating the “welfare trap” of extremely high marginal rates that
lower-income individuals face as higher incomes cause large drops in their eligibility for
various transfer payments under antipoverty programs. See Jeffrey Dorfman, Welfare Offers
Short-Term Help and Long-Term Poverty, Thanks to Asset Tests, FORBES (Oct. 13, 2016, 11:00
AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/jeffreydorfman/2016/10/13/welfare-offers-short-term-help-
and-long-term-poverty/ [https://perma.cc/2W4Z-AY99].
276. See 1 BITTKER & LOKKEN, supra note 38, ¶ 3.1.4; Alan J. Auerbach & Kevin A.
Hassett, A New Measure of Horizontal Equity, 92 AM. ECON. REV. 1116, 1116 (2002) (“There
is virtual unanimity that horizontal equity, treating equals equally, is a worthy goal of any
tax system.”).
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resolution of large corporations’ tax matters.277 Current tax law of-
fers numerous elections into different substantive rules, often with
arbitrary conditions for eligibility.278
The second objection—that the government randomizes some
taxpayers who opt in into the control group—weakens when one
considers that the IRS already uses randomization to audit tax-
payers.279 Just as auditing provides valuable information to the IRS,
randomizing some taxpayers into the control group provides valu-
able information on whether an alternative tax regime has in-
creased tax collections. A Kantian might object that randomization
on individual taxpayers for informational purposes violates the
principle that each person should be treated as an end rather than
merely as a means.280 Even assuming the validity of this principle,
however, the randomization into the control group is not treating
taxpayers solely as a means. The goal of contractual tax reform is to
better accommodate diverse individual preferences, which increases
277. Shamik Trivedi & Amy Elliott, LB&I Expands, Makes Permanent CAP Real-Time
Audit Program, 131 TAX NOTES 10, 10 (2011); INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., Compliance As-
surance Process (CAP)—Frequently Asked Questions (FAQs), https://www.irs.gov/busines
ses/corporations/compliance-assurance-process-cap-frequently-asked-questions-faqs
[https://perma.cc/JKF4-QZWR]. Budgetary restrictions have led the IRS to close CAP to new
participants as of 2017, despite its popularity. INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., IRS Continues
Comprehensive Assessment of the CAP Program, https://web.archive.org/web/201811050403
36/https://www.irs.gov/businesses/corporations/irs-continues-comprehensive-assessment-of-
the-cap-program [https://perma.cc/9BSN-2RQG].
278. See, e.g., Treas. Reg. § 1.1502-75(h) (2019) (setting forth mechanics for a group of
corporations to opt into filing a consolidated return); id. §§ 1.1502-1 to -100 (governing the
consolidated return tax regime); KEVIN M. HENNESSEY ET AL., THE CONSOLIDATED TAX
RETURN, Westlaw (database updated Oct. 2019) (treatise dedicated to the consolidated tax
return regime); id. ch. 2 (discussing the extensive requirements to be eligible to opt into the
consolidated return regime); see also, e.g., I.R.C. § 1362(a) (2012) (opting into being an “S
corporation”); id. § 856(c)(1) (opting into being a “real estate investment trust”).
279. For details on how the IRS selects taxpayers to audit in part based on random
considerations, see INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., IRM 4.1.3.2 (Aug. 10, 2012), which explains
how a Discriminant Index Function affects the likelihood that a taxpayer will be audited, and
id. 4.22.1.5(5) (Oct. 1, 2008), which allows the National Research Program to choose taxpayers
at random. For a broader discussion of randomization in tax administration, see Sarah B.
Lawsky, Fairly Random: On Compensating Audited Taxpayers, 41 CONN. L. REV. 161, 166-68
(2008).
280. See IMMANUEL KANT, GROUNDWORK OF THE METAPHYSIC OF MORALS 96 (H.J. Paton
trans., Harper Torchbooks 1964) (1785) (“Act in such a way that you always treat humanity,
whether in your own person or in the person of any other, never simply as a means, but
always at the same time as an end.” (emphasis omitted)); see also Abramowicz et al., supra
note 223, at 964 & n.128.
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autonomy.281 A Kantian would argue that law has the imperative to
respect each individual as an end in him- or herself, including his or
her freedom to pursue his or her own ends and conception of the
good life.282 Alternative tax regimes respect this imperative and are
justifiable on Kantian grounds.283
Control-group taxpayers may not get the same benefits as
treatment-group taxpayers, but they are no worse off. It is common
for governmental programs to choose only a subset of applicants to
participate,284 and contractual tax reform simply would not work if
everyone participates. A control-group taxpayer might still benefit
from randomization anyway, and not just because the experiment
might produce information that leads to better tax policy. A control-
group taxpayer one time might be a treatment-group taxpayer in
another period.285 Meanwhile, an intermediary in theory could offer
insurance, with payoffs equal to the premium divided by the
probability of being randomized to control. Under expected utility
theory, “it is well established that a risk-averse individual will
purchase full insurance when the insurance contract is fairly
priced.”286 That is, a rational purchaser should buy just enough in-
surance to be indifferent to those outcomes. Usually, insurance is
expensive to provide because underwriting requires risk assess-
ment, but here the risk is transparent, so insurance should be
cheap. If such insurance is provided, to enable the insurance func-
tion to work, premiums should not be deductible and payouts should
not be taxed.
281. See supra Part I.B.
282. See KANT, supra note 280, at 98.
283. See, e.g., supra Part I.B.2 (discussing alternative regimes better accommodating
different taxpayers’ different work versus leisure preferences).
284. See, e.g., DAVID GREENBERG ET AL., SOCIAL EXPERIMENTATION AND PUBLIC POLICY-
MAKING 225 (2003) (noting that the impossibility of serving all individuals is a justification
for randomization).
285. We would not allow the control-group taxpayer to contract with another intermediary
in the same year. In theory, the first intermediary’s tax bill might depend on whatever the
control-group taxpayer pays to the second intermediary. But there is a danger of side
payments, in which the first intermediary rewards the second for giving a good deal to the
taxpayer, lowering the intermediary’s bill. The probability of this outcome is much less
worrisome across time periods.
286. Michael Braun & Alexander Muermann, The Impact of Regret on the Demand for
Insurance, 71 J. RISK & INS. 737, 737 (2004). Prospective insureds, however, do not always
follow the recommendations of expected utility theory. See id. at 738.
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CONCLUSION
This Article has outlined how contractual tax reform could
increase taxpayer utility without adversely affecting government
revenues. Private intermediaries would design alternative tax
regimes. Using AI and other data-based models, the intermediaries
would invite certain taxpayers to opt in. Of those who do so, the
government would randomize some percentage to a control group to
measure the revenue that those subject to the alternative regime
would have raised if subjected to the generally applicable tax code.
The intermediaries either could be for-profit or could be coopera-
tives, operated for the benefit of those who opt in. Regulation of
insurers provides a model for regulating the private tax intermedi-
aries, who would be similar in many ways. Particularly in early
implementations, the deviations from existing tax law would likely
be relatively small, but substantial benefits could still be achieved,
including increased taxpayer utility and increased government tax
revenues.
